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| BROOKS v. THE STATE. S01A1414. SEARS, Presiding Justice. Murder. DeKalb Superior Court. Before Judge Hancock. | The appellant, Michael Brooks, appeals from his conviction for the murder of Terrence Smith, and for the aggravated assault of Ernest Carson. 1 On appeal, the sole issue raised by Brooks is that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for malice murder. However, having reviewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that the evidence would have authorized a rational trier of fact to reject Brooks's testimony that he acted in selfdefense and to find that Brooks acted with malice in shooting Smith three times while he lay on a sofa. Accordingly, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found Brooks guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the malice murder of Smith. 2 Similarly, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support Brooks's conviction for the aggravated assault of Carson. 3J. Tom Morgan, District Attorney, Barbara B. Conroy, Andrette Watson, Assistant District Attorneys, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Adam M. Hames, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. | 1
The crime occurred on May 15, 1999. Brooks was indicted on August 19, 1999. A jury found Brooks guilty on September 1, 2000, of the malice murder and felony murder of Smith and the aggravated assault of Carson. The felony murder conviction was vacated by operation of law, see OCGA 16-1-7; Goforth v. State, 271 Ga. 700 (523 SE2d 868) (1999), and on September 1, the trial court sentenced Brooks to life in prison for malice murder and to twenty consecutive years in prison for aggravated assault. Brooks filed a motion for new trial on September 5, 2000. On November 16, 2000, the court reporter certified the trial transcript. On April 30, 2001, the trial court denied Brooks's motion for new trial, and on May 23, 2001, Brooks filed a notice of appeal. On June 21, 2001, the appeal was docketed in this Court, and on August 13, it was submitted for decision on briefs. 2
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 3
Id.had provided the State Bar's membership department proved fruitless. In February 2000, this Court suspended respondent's license to practice law in Georgia, pursuant to Bar Rule 4-204.3 (d). Thereafter, the special master appointed by this Court found that respondent's conduct violated Standard 4 (engaging in professional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or wilful misrepresentation); Standard 22 (b) (withdrawing from employment without taking reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the client); Standard 44 (wilfully abandoning or disregarding a legal matter to the client's detriment); Standard 45 (b) (knowingly making a false statement of fact); Standard 65 (A) (commingling client and personal funds); Standard 65 (D) (withdrawing trust account funds for personal use); and Standard 68 (failing to respond to disciplinary authorities).Another client filed a grievance against respondent in September 1999. That client asserted she had retained respondent in 1998 to represent her in a legal matter arising from an automobile collision. At the client's request, respondent provided her with the case's file number, which the client later learned from the court clerk was an invalid case number. Despite the client's attempts, respondent refused to communicate with her about her legal matter. In her grievance, the client noted that if respondent had not filed suit by September 1999, her cause of action was lost. Again, respondent did not respond to the Notice of Investigation. The Investigative Panel determined there was probable cause to believe respondent had violated Standards 44 (wilfully abandoning or disregarding a legal matter to the client's detriment) and 68 (failure to respond to notice of disciplinary authorities) of the Standards of Conduct set forth in Bar Rule 4-102 (d), and a Notice of Discipline was served on respondent by publication. See State Bar Rule 4-203.1 (b) (3) (ii).Respondent's undisputed conduct warrants the sanction of disbarment. In the Matter of Greenwood, 271 Ga. 702 (524 SE2d 210) (1999); In the Matter of Reeves, 270 Ga. 507 (511 SE2d 516) (1999); In the Matter of Brown, 268 Ga. 477 (493 SE2d 191) (1997). There is no evidence of mitigating circumstances. See In the Matter of Bryson, 269 Ga. 581 (502 SE2d 219) (1998). Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that Jeffrey Ross Bowie be disbarred from the practice of law in Georgia. He is reminded of his duties under Bar Rule 4-219 (c).Disbarred. All the Justices concur.DECIDED OCTOBER 5, 2001.Disbarment.William P. Smith III, General Counsel State Bar, K. Gene Chapman, Assistant General Counsel State Bar, for State Bar of Georgia. | |
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