Gregory Austin Barnett was 17 years old when he was arrested, charged and convicted of, inter alia, driving under the influence of alcohol with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.02 grams. OCGA 40-6-391 (k). Barnett's breathalyzer test revealed a blood alcohol concentration of 0.048. The trial court denied his motion to declare OCGA 40-6-391 (k) unconstitutional. We affirm. Barnett contends subsection (k) of OCGA 40-6-391 violates his equal protection rights under the State and Federal constitutions by setting forth a blood alcohol concentration standard different for persons under age 21 than for persons above age 21 (which is 0.10 grams, id. at (a) (5)) where there exists a statutory presumption that persons with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.05 grams or less are deemed not to be under the influence of alcohol. OCGA 40-6-392 (b) (1). "When assessing equal protection challenges, a statute is tested under a standard of strict judicial scrutiny if it either operates to the disadvantage of a suspect class or interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right. [Cit.]" Ambles v. State, 259 Ga. 406, 407 (2) ( 383 SE2d 555) (1989). "If neither a suspect class nor a fundamental right is affected by the statute, the statute need only bear a rational relationship to some legitimate state purpose. [Cit.]" Id. The age of a person does not place him within a suspect class for purposes of equal protection. Phagan v. State, 268 Ga. 272, 274-275 (2) ( 486 SE2d 876) (1997). Driving a vehicle under the influence of any amount of alcohol is not a fundamental right. See generally Ambles, supra at 408 (2) (b). "Since the statute does not disadvantage a suspect class or interfere with the exercise of a fundamental right, it need only bear a reasonable relationship to a legitimate state purpose. [Cits.]" Phagan, supra at 275. Protection of the public safety and safeguarding the physical well-being of children represent two legitimate state purposes. Union City Bd. of Zoning Appeals v. Justice Outdoor Displays, 266 Ga. 393, 400 (3) ( 467 SE2d 875) (1996); Phagan, supra at 274 (1). OCGA 40-6-391 (k) bears a reasonable relationship to both of these purposes, in that it protects public safety by prohibiting the operation of motor vehicles by young people who lack experience both in driving and in judging the effect of alcohol on their ability to drive, thus posing a greater threat to the public safety than older, more experienced drivers. Further, it protects children by providing a strong disincentive to violate alcohol consumption laws, see OCGA 3-3-23, and makes it easier for young drivers who are inexperienced with alcohol to understand and accept that they are legally unable to drive if they consume virtually any amount of alcohol, thereby promoting the well-being of children by protecting them from the dangers of driving while intoxicated. Therefore, we conclude that the General Assembly had a rational basis for enacting OCGA 40-6-391 (k) and the statute thus does not violate Barnett's equal protection rights under the State or Federal constitutions. 1Channing Ruskell, Solicitor, for appellee. | 
