1. Though at one place in the finding of the habeas corpus judge it is stated that the sentences are to be "served concurrently," it is quite obvious that he intended to find "the sentences to be served consecutively," for if otherwise he would have ordered the release of the prisoner. The trial record clearly shows that the sentences were to run consecutively. Kidnapping and robbery as defined under the laws in effect in 1969 (former Code 26-1601, 26-2501, as amended) involve proof of distinct essential elements, and even though here based on one continuing transaction, neither is included within the other. Therefore, it was not unlawful to provide for separate sentences to be served consecutively and not concurrently. See Blair v. State, 81 Ga. 629 (7 SE 855). Also, see Blockburger v. United States, 284 U. S. 299 (52 SC 180, 76 LE 306); Gavieres v. United States, 220 U. S. 338 (31 SC 421, 55 LE 489); Gore v. United States, 357 U. S. 386 (78 SC 1280, 2 LE2d 1405).

2. The petitioner is not entitled as a matter of right to appointed counsel in a state habeas corpus proceeding. Griffin v. Smith, 228 Ga. 177 (3) (184 SE2d 459).

3. That the habeas corpus judge may have departed from the issues presented and inquired into other matters discloses no basis for reversible error under the circumstances here shown.

Jimmy Chatman, pro se.