This appeal challenges the constitutionality of former OCGA 15-11-41 (g). 1 For the reasons which follow, we reject the challenge.

On March 2, 1994, T. B., a juvenile, was adjudicated delinquent by the Juvenile Court of Gordon County for acts of child molestation and aggravated child molestation against his brothers and sister. T. B. was committed jointly to the Department of Children & Youth Services (DCYS) and the Gordon County Department of Family & Children Services (DFCS). The commitment to DCYS was for a period of two years. Near the end of that time, DCYS moved for an extension of custody pursuant to former OCGA 15-11-41 (g). The juvenile court conducted a hearing in the matter at which T. B. was represented by an attorney and a guardian ad litem. T. B.'s counsel argued that former OCGA 15-11-41 (g) violated the substantive due process and double jeopardy provisions of the State and Federal Constitutions. On March 25, 1996, the court entered an order extending T. B.'s custody in DCYS for an additional period of two years from the date of the original commitment. In its ruling, the juvenile court found as fact that all participants, including the guardian ad litem, stipulated and agreed that T. B. was in need of continuing sex offender treatment at a specific psychiatric facility and that a continuation of commitment to DCYS to obtain such counseling would be in T. B.'s best interest. The court also concluded as a matter of law that former OCGA 15-11-41 (g) did not violate either the State or Federal Constitution.

T. B. urges that the juvenile court erred in refusing to find the statutory provision violative of federal and state constitutional protections against double jeopardy 2 because it permits the juvenile court to increase the sentence for a delinquent act after the juvenile has begun serving the sentence. However, the argument miscasts an extension of custody under the statutory scheme as a sentence of punishment and ignores the very purpose of Chapter 11 and Title 15. See In the Interest of M. J. F., 191 Ga. App. 792, 793 (5) (383 SE2d 173) (1989). Compare Harris v. State, 261 Ga. 859, 860 (2) (413 SE2d 439) (1992), cited by appellant.

The express purpose of the Juvenile Court Code is to assist, protect, and restore children whose well-being as secure members of society is threatened. OCGA 15-11-1 (1). In furtherance of that goal, the Legislature created a comprehensive civil forum 3 for the treatment and protection of juveniles. OCGA 15-11-38. In the Interest of S. H., 220 Ga. App. 569, 571 (469 SE2d 810) (1996). The statutory scheme is "replete with distinctions between criminal matters and matters concerning juveniles alleged delinquent. . . . The juvenile code is concerned with the care, guidance, and well-being of children . . . , [and] [j]uveniles are declared delinquent because they need treatment and rehabilitation. OCGA 15-11-2 (7)." In the Interest of M. B., 217 Ga. App. 660, 661 (458 SE2d 864) (1995).

It is certainly true that "constitutional considerations must necessarily transcend even the most admirable legislative purposes." In the Interest of S. H., supra at 571, citing In the Interest of S. L. H., 205 Ga. App. 278, 280 (422 SE2d 43) (1992). However, here there is no conflict. An order of extension under former OCGA 15-11-41 (g) operates to further the accomplishment of the juvenile's treatment and rehabilitation, and thus, does not run afoul of the constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy.

T. Joseph Campbell, District Attorney, Rebecca B. Paris, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.