"Where the parties in a divorce proceeding enter into a contract settling between themselves the questions of alimony, custody, and support of their minor children, the court may in its discretion approve the agreement in whole or in part, or refuse to approve it as a whole. If any change is made in the agreement as incorporated in the decree which makes the decree conflict with the agreement of the parties, the words of the decree will control." Booker v. Booker, 219 Ga. 358, 359 (133 SE2d 353).

On October 31, 1966, Charleen Savoie Wiggin filed an action for divorce against George Miller Wiggin. Attached to the petition was a property settlement agreement signed by the parties on the same date, in which, among other things, the husband agreed to make monthly payments to the wife for a period of years followed by a lump-sum payment as alimony. In addition to the other customary prayers of such a petition the wife prayed that the property settlement agreement entered into between the plaintiff and defendant be made the judgment of the court and that the court allow plaintiff's counsel reasonable attorney's fees for services rendered to the plaintiff in such cause. Thereafter, after a rule nisi issued, the trial court entered a judgment awarding attorneys' fees in a stated amount on November 17, 1966. On December 8, 1966, a final decree of divorce was entered which granted the divorce, approved the property settlement agreement and in effect affirmed the award of attorney's fees by stating that the court took judicial cognizance of the fact that the court did on November 17, 1966, enter an order requiring the defendant to pay to the plaintiff's attorneys a designated sum as attorneys' fees as provided in such order. George Miller Wiggin appealed from the judgment of November 17, 1966, awarding attorneys' fees and enumerates such judgment as error because it was in conflict with the property settlement agreement signed lay the parties on October 31, 1966.

The appellee filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as frivolous and because no question as to the authority of the trial court to render such judgment was raised in the trial court.

1. The appeal filed within the time prescribed by law from an appealable judgment is not subject to the appellee's motion to dismiss. See Ga. L. 1965, p. 18; Ga. L. 1966, pp. 493, 496 (Code Ann. 6-701, 6-803).

2. "Where the parties in a divorce proceeding enter into a contract settling between themselves the questions of alimony, custody, and support of their minor children, the court may in its discretion approve the agreement in whole or in part, or refuse to approve it as a whole. If any change is made in the agreement as incorporated in the decree which makes the decree conflict with the agreement of the parties, the words of the decree will control. Amos v. Amos, 212 Ga. 670, 671 (2) (95 SE2d 5)." Booker v. Booker, 219 Ga. 358, 359 (133 SE2d 353); Barrett v. Manus, 219 Ga. 693, 694 (135 SE2d 430).

The plaintiff sought, in addition to a divorce, not only the approval of the agreement but also attorneys' fees. At a hearing, before the final hearing on the main issue in the case, the trial court awaited attorneys' fees and in the final decree approved the agreement with the modification made by the prior award of attorneys' fees. The award of attorneys' fees in accordance with the prayers of the plaintiff's petition and within the discretion of the trial court was not error for any reason assigned.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.