The petition as amended did not state a cause of action for equitable relief.

On December 16, 1964, S. J. Shirley filed a petition for equitable relief against. the City of Commerce, a municipal corporation, and its mayor and council. In so far as material here, it was alleged: The petitioner is the owner of described real estate on which he has been operating a diesel-powered feed mill. Pursuant to complaints by adjacent property owners, the mayor and council on June 8, 1964, enacted an ordinance making it unlawful for the petitioner to operate his feed mill in the city limits under conditions therein specified. On November 16, 1964, the defendants served him with charges of violating this ordinance, requiring him to appear in the mayor's court on November 19, 1964. Because of the illness of counsel the hearing was continued until December 23, 1964. The ordinance is an arbitrary and capricious discrimination against the petitioner's lawful business and, for stated reasons, the ordinance violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution and Art. I, Sec. I, Pars. II and III of the State Constitution (Code Ann. 2-102 and 2-103). Unless restrained and enjoined, the defendants will subject the petitioner to repeated prosecutions and he will suffer inseparable damage. The prayers were for process; that the ordinance be declared unconstitutional and void; and that the defendants be temporarily restrained and permanently enjoined from interfering with the petitioner's feed mill business.

Rule nisi was issued setting the cause for a hearing on January 15, 1965, and pending the hearing the defendants were enjoined from prosecuting any charges against the petitioner. The defendants filed their general and special demurrers to the petition on December 24, 1964.

The petitioner excepts to an order disallowing the amendment on objection thereto, and to a judgment sustaining the renewed general demurrers to the petition as amended.

It has long been the general rule that equity will not interfere in the administration of the criminal law. Code 55-102; Gault v. Wallis, 53 Ga. 675 (4); Phillips v. Mayor &c. of Stone Mountain, 61 Ga. 386; Pope v. Mayor &c. of Savannah, 74 Ga. 365; Hodges v. State Revenue Commission, 183 Ga. 832 (190 SE 36); Baker v. City of Atlanta, 211 Ga. 34 (83 SE2d 682).

However, it has likewise long been recognized that there are exceptions to the general rule that equity will not interfere in criminal prosecutions. City of Atlanta v. Gate City Gas Light Co., 71 Ga. 106. In Moultrie Milk Shed Inc. v. City of Cairo, 206 Ga. 348 (1) (57 SE2d 199), it is stated: "[E]quity has jurisdiction to protect property rights where employees refuse to serve because of threatened criminal action, and thereby the petitioner's business is destroyed." The same rule was applied by this court in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. City of Columbus, 189 Ga. 458 (6 SE2d 320); and City of Albany v. Lippitt, 191 Ga. 756 (13 SE2d 807).

The present case does not fall within the exception to the general rule. The petition does not show any interference with the petitioner's business in any form, nor with any of his employees, if any he has. Neither the petition nor the amendment alleges that any effort has been made, or will be made, to enforce the ordinance other than by prosecution in the mayor's court. The validity of the ordinance may be attacked in the mayor's court, and the decision, if adverse to the petitioner, may be reviewed in the manner provided by law. Mayor &c. of Savannah v. Granger, 145 Ga. 578 (89 SE 690); City of Bainbridge v. Olan Mills, Inc., 207 Ga. 636 (63 SE2d 655).