Where, under the provisions of Code Ann. 99-1503 and 99-1504 (Ga. L. 1941, p. 241; 1949, p. 1141), the Board of Commissioners of Roads and Revenues of Meriwether County adopted a resolution finding a need for the creation of a Hospital Authority for Meriwether County, named seven trustees therein and fixed their terms by staggering them with determination thereto by lot, and provided therein for successor trustees to be appointed by the trustees, the Commissioners thereby performed their full duty under the law relating to trustees, and they now have no duty under the law relating to trustees and have no duty to appoint successor trustees; and the petition by taxpayers to compel them to appoint successor trustees was properly dismissed on demurrer.

By mandamus the petitioners, as residents, citizens and taxpayers of Meriwether County, sought to compel the Board of Commissioners of Roads and Revenues of Meriwether County to perform their duty, imposed upon the members thereof by law, to make all appointments to the Board of Trustees of the Meriwether County Hospital Authority, alleging that the terms of the original trustees had all expired and did not extend for more than seven years, and no additional appointments had been made since the original appointments in 1954. Attached to the application for mandamus was a copy of the resolution creating the Hospital Authority in conformity with Code Ann. Ch. 99-15 (Ga. L. 1941, p. 241, as amended), and by an amendment to the application, which was allowed subject to objection, a later resolution of the County Commissioners attempting to change the method of appointing trustees to the Hospital Authority was alleged to be in full force and effect. Thereafter, other parties sought to intervene and filed a general demurrer to the petition. The respondents also filed a general demurrer thereto, and, after a hearing, the court allowed the intervention, overruled a motion to strike the amendment to the application, sustained both general demurrers and dismissed the application. The exception is to the final judgment sustaining the general demurrers and dismissing the application.

Counsel have argued the point as to whether quo warranto rather than mandamus is the proper remedy, and we might question whether the intervention in a mandamus proceeding was authorized by law; but the general demurrer of respondents was sustained, and that judgment is properly excepted to and is presented for review, hence enabling us to decide the case without reference to the intervention. Also, in order to determine if mandamus is the proper remedy, it is necessary to look to the law (Code Ann. Ch. 99-15; Ga. L. 1941, pp. 241, 250; 1949, pp. 1141, 1142) and the resolution adopted by the county governing authority pursuant thereto. If the statute (Code Ann. 99-1503) imposes upon the county commissioners the duty of electing successor trustees, and they have refused to perform that duty, then mandamus is an available remedy for the petitioning taxpayers to compel performance of that duty. Code 64-101, 64-104; Thomas v. Ragsdale, 188 Ga. 238 (3 SE2d 567). Hence the procedure is the proper one.

But when we examine the law, we find that the act created this hospital authority as a "public body corporate and politic," and provides that it could be activated only by a resolution by the county commissioners declaring that there was need for an authority to function in the county. This law further provides that the authority shall consist of a board of not less than five nor more than nine trustees to be appointed by the governing body of the county for such term as may be authorized by the resolution thereinafter provided for. The resolution thus referred to is the one finding a need for the authority. Thus is provided for the activation and setting up of a governing body for the authority. This having been done, the corporation is completed and in full existence with no mentioning at this point of how succeeding trustees are to be appointed. However, in the next section (Code Ann. 99-1504) it is provided that: "The trustees shall be residents of the participating units comprising the authority, but their successors shall be appointed as provided for by such resolution."

Conforming to the foregoing provisions of the statute, the county commissioners adopted the one resolution required of them by the law in which they found a need for the authority; appointed seven trustees for various staggered terms of years to be determined by lot, and provided therein for the appointment of successor trustees by the trustees themselves, the wording being that it shall be a self-perpetuating board of trustees. Having adopted the resolution containing such provisions, the county commissioners performed every duty that the law put upon them concerning the activation, organization and continuation of the authority.

But counsel for the applicants insists that the provisions of the law requiring the commissioners to appoint trustees and fix their terms is a continuing duty embracing the appointment of successor trustees. His reply to the provision of Code Ann. 99-1504, which says that successor trustees shall be appointed as provided for by such resolution is that this relates only to other provisions of the law in Code Ann. 99-1503, dealing with more than one city or county and providing for the appointment of trustees for each participating unit. While there is some plausibility in that argument, we think it overlooks the fact that the duty to activate and organize by appointing trustees and fixing their terms is imposed precisely alike upon the governing units, irrespective of their number, and it all requires only one resolution by each; and such resolution must provide how successor trustees shall be named. We are here dealing with an authority embracing only one county, and its resolution discharged every duty laid upon the county commissioners relating to the appointment of trustees and providing how successor trustees shall be appointed. It follows that the defendants had no duty to perform the act of appointing successor trustees, which the petition sought to compel them to perform; hence no cause of action is alleged, and it was not error to sustain the general demurrer and dismiss the petition.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.