1. In so far as the exception to that portion of the judgment of the trial court modifying the restraining order previously granted is concerned, the exception is premature and can not be considered. See Wright v. Thompson, 147 Ga. 500 (94 S. E. 767); Berry v. Parker, 130, Ga. 741 (61 S. E. 541); College Park Cemetery v. Cottongim, 185 Ga. 741 (196 S. E. 409).

2. The remaining question for consideration is whether or not it was error to overrule the general demurrer to the petition. Equity has jurisdiction over accounting between tenants in common. Code, 37-301. "Equity has concurrent jurisdiction with courts of law, over matters of account between tenants in common, and when asserted, a court of chancery will hold and exercise it for the purpose of settling all the equities between the tenants, growing out of the tenancy in common." Andrews v. Murphy, 12 Ga. 431. See also Huff v. McDonald, 22 Ga. 131. "Where a number of cotenants are in possession of all of the common property and are collecting the rents and profits thereof, an equitable action for partition and accounting by those not in possession of the property is a proper remedy." Chambers v. Schall, 209 Ga. 18 (70 S. E. 2d, 463), and cases there cited. It is insisted that these rules of law do not apply in the instant case for the reason the petition shows that the petitioner had contracted to sell her one-half interest in the property to the defendant for a stated sum according to the terms of a contract attached as an exhibit to the petition. That might be true except for the fact that the petition further shows that a court of equity has adjudicated this contract unenforceable in a court of equity because of inadequacy of consideration. True it is that the petition shows that specific performance of the contract was denied by a court of equity on the ground of inadequacy of consideration. This does not mean that the contract is necessarily void. However, the instant suit is in a court of equity, and the equity court must give effect to its former judgment concerning the contract. Since it is all too well established to require citation of authority that, when the parties are properly in a court of equity, that court will give effect to all the rights of the parties, both legal and equitable, it follows that whatever rights may exist under the terms of the contract can be adjudicated in this proceeding, and there was no error in the judgment overruling the general demurrer.

S. B. Wallace and W. E. Watkins, for plaintiff in error.