1. Where a person who died testate in 1943 appoints a trustee for his estate, gives his widow an annuity with the further provision that expenses of her last illness, and funeral be paid from the estate, and subject thereto gives his brother the life interest therein, and upon his brother's death to his brother's child or children during their minority, with remainder over to his brother's child or children--after the death of his brother, his brother's only child, who has now attained his majority, is entitled to receive the property of the estate; subject, however, to a charge in favor of the testator's widow for the annuity and expenses of her last illness and funeral, which charge is an equitable lien upon the property delivered to the remainderman.

2. The petition is lacking in essential allegations to authorize an accounting.

3. The question whether the appointment of two trustees for the estate of John D. Gilmore was authorized under the will of Thomas W. Gilmore is now moot.

Mrs. Polly S. Blanchard, formerly Mrs. Polly S. Gilmore, the widow of John D. Gilmore, filed a suit against E. W. Jordan and Mrs. Winifred R. Gilmore, as trustees of the estate of John D. Gilmore. The petition alleged that John D. Gilmore died March 7, 1943, leaving a will. The will provided that his wife be given $1500, an automobile, certain described household furniture, the right to occupy the family residence as long as it was owned by his estate, and that she be paid from the estate $225 per month during her natural life, and also expenses of her last illness and funeral expenses. The testator named his brother, Thomas W. Gilmore, executor and trustee, and subject to the $225 per month for the widow, gave him the life interest, with remainder over to his child or children.

The executor and trustee was given power to sell, without advertisement and without an order of court, any property of the estate, and to reinvest the same with the utmost liberty, without being restricted to investments in which trustees may invest under statutes of this State. He was also relieved of inventory, appraisement, or making return to the court of ordinary. The will provided also that the trustee, Thomas W. Gilmore, may provide by will in case of his death, for a successor as trustee to handle the estate during the life of his wife and during the minority of any child or children that may be living at his death. On March 13, 1946, Thomas W. Gilmore died testate, and in his will nominated E. W. Jordan and Mrs. Winifred R. Gilmore, the defendants in the instant suit, as successor trustees of the estate of John D. Gilmore; and they have since so served.

When Thomas W. Gilmore, the life tenant under the will of John D. Gilmore, died, he left one son, Thomas W. Gilmore Jr., who has now reached his majority. It is alleged that the trustees consider their trust as terminated, that they are no longer trustees under the will, that the entire interest of the estate has now vested in Thomas W. Gilmore Jr., the residuary legatee under the will, subject to his paying the $225 per month to the petitioner and the expense of her last illness and funeral, and that the trustees are preparing to deliver the property to Thomas W. Gilmore Jr.

The petition contains various allegations as to the acquisition of portions of the property of the estate of John D. Gilmore from other deceased brothers; that there were interlocking business interests between deceased brothers; and that the present defendants are joint administrators of the estate of a brother, Alex Gilmore, in addition to the fiduciary capacities heretofore mentioned. It is alleged that numerous requests and demands have been made for an accounting from each of the above estates, but with no avail. No value is placed on the particular estate involved, though it is alleged that property of the value of $200,000 has been sold, and there are now pending petitions for the sale and reinvestment of property of the value of $150,000.

The trial judge sustained general demurrers to the petition, and exceptions are to that order.

(After stating the foregoing facts.) This case was previously before this court ( Gilmore v. Gilmore, 201 Ga. 770, 41 S. E. 2d, 229), where it was held that the personal and discretionary powers conferred upon the original trustee nominated in the will of John D. Gilmore were not conferred upon the successor trustees appointed by the will of the original trustee.

1. The controlling question here presented is whether the will created a trust in favor of the wife, which would necessitate the retention of the estate in the hands of the trustees; or whether the trustees should deliver the corpus of the estate to the remainderman, Thomas W. Gilmore Jr., subject to the corpus being charged with the rights of the wife as stated in the will.

310) amending the law of trusts as to persons sui juris is not effective here.

Attorneys for the wife contend that whether or not a trust is executed and the legal title passes to the beneficiary does not depend upon the law of force when the trust was created, but is controlled by the law existing at the time the trust is claimed to be executed, and cite for this ruling Knorr v. Raymond, 73 Ga. 749 (11c). That case differs on its facts and on principle from the instant case. To hold that the act of 1950, p. 310, continued the trust in force and deferred the possession and enjoyment of the remainder estate from Thomas W. Gilmore Jr. after he reached his majority, would be in violation of his vested rights; and the Knorr case, supra, specifically states that such could not be done. When Thomas W. Gilmore Jr. arrived at his majority he was entitled to have delivered the property devised to him under the will. Stringfellow v. Harman, 207 Ga. 62 (60 S. E. 2d, 139), and citations.

On the other hand, it is equally clear that the widow is entitled to her annuity and the expenses of her last illness and funeral to be paid from the property composing the estate. A testamentary legacy is a charge against the corpus of the estate. Tinsley v. Maddox, 176 Ga. 471 (14) (168 S. E. 297). Had the will, in creating these charges in favor of the widow, provided that they be a charge upon the realty, or any particular portion of the realty, this charge would have followed the land under Code 113-822, which provides: "Annuities, or legacies, or debts charged upon lands by testaments, attach thereto and follow the land in the hands of all persons." See also Bell v. Watkins, 104 Ga. 345 (30 S. E. 756); Harvey v. Greenfield, 186 Ga. 192 (2) (197 S. E. 276). Under such circumstances the charge would be protected by a legal lien upon the land. But the charge in favor of the widow here is not against land, because, even though there was land in the estate at the time of the death of the testator, be gave his original executor unlimited power to convert it into personalty, and therefore no lien as fixed by law is attached, although provisions made for her are primary claims against the property comprising the estate and should be protected.

Accordingly, we hold that the trust created by the will has been executed, that the remainderman is entitled to receive the estate from the trustees, but that the property in the hands of the remainderman is charged with an equitable lien in favor of the widow subject to the provisions made for her in the will.

2. While the petitioner prays for an accounting as between the estate of John D. Gilmore and the estates of his deceased brothers, and also for an accounting as between herself and the present trustees of the estate of John D. Gilmore, it is not alleged that the trustees are in arrears as to her annuity or that anything is due her, or any other reason why an accounting would be beneficial to her or would be necessary for her protection. Gould v. Barrow, 117 Ga. 458 (43 S. E. 702); Smith v. Hancock, 163 Ga. 222 (5) (136 S. E. 52); Calbeck v. Herrington, 169 Ga. 869 (2b) (152 S. E. 53); Clements v. Hollingsworth, 205 Ga. 153 (3) (52 S. E. 2d, 465).

3. Under the ruling made in the first division of this opinion, the question of whether the appointment of two trustees for the estate of John D. Gilmore was authorized under the will of Thomas W. Gilmore, instead of a sole trustee, is now moot.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Duckworth, C. J., who dissents.