Johnny Chuck Rolader pled guilty to aggravated child molestation. The trial court sentenced Rolader to fifteen years, requiring him to serve ten years and probating the balance. Rolader appeals, asserting that the trial court erred in ruling that it lacked discretion to sentence him under OCGA 17-10-1 (b), which would have made him eligible for parole prior to the completion of his sentenced incarceration. We disagree and therefore affirm.

OCGA 17-10-1 (b) permits the sentencing judge to determine whether the person being sentenced can be considered for parole prior to completion of the prison sentence. However, OCGA 17-10-6.1, which defines aggravated child molestation as a " 'serious violent felony,' " 1 prohibits the reduction of the mandatory minimum prison sentence for serious violent felonies by any form of pardon or parole. 2 Because Rolader was convicted of a serious violent felony, the trial court had no discretion to sentence him under OCGA 17-10-1 (b). 3

Rolader also asserts that the trial court erred in applying OCGA 17-10-6.1 because that section conflicts with OCGA 17-10-1 (b). In Taylor v. State, 4 we concluded that these two Code sections are not conflicting, and for the reasons expressed in that case, we reject Rolader's argument here.

We also disagree with Rolader that application of OCGA 17-10-6.1 renders OCGA 17-10-1 (b) meaningless. Rolader's argument is premised on his contention that, aside from serious violent felonies, there are no other crimes to which OCGA 17-10-1 (b) can be applied. Because there are a host of other crimes to which OCGA 17-10-1 (b) could be applied, this argument fails as well. 5

Richard R. Read, District Attorney, Dabney Y. Kentner, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.