On May 3, 2000, Michael J. Cullers pled guilty but mentally ill to two counts of aggravated assault and one count of obstruction of an officer. 1
In his sole enumeration of error, Cullers contends that his plea was not freely and voluntarily given.
"The most reliable method of perfecting the record is to conduct an inquiry into the defendant's understanding of the nature and consequences of his plea." 3
In this case, the trial judge thoroughly inquired into Cullers' understanding of the rights he waived by entering a guilty plea. He informed Cullers of his right to a jury trial, the presumption of his innocence, and his right to confront his accusers and to subpoena witnesses to testify on his behalf. The trial judge explained to Cullers that he had a right to testify in his own behalf and that if he chose not to testify, it would not be held against him in any way. In each instance, Cullers indicated that he understood his rights. When asked if he had been threatened or promised leniency in exchange for his guilty plea, Cullers replied that he had not.
It is readily apparent from the record that Cullers was made cognizant of the rights he waived by pleading guilty. Though the record does not show whether he was cognizant of the sentencing consequences of his plea, this lapse does not render his plea invalid. "There is no constitutional requirement that a defendant be advised of the length of his sentence before a court accepts his guilty plea." 4
Cullers argues that his plea should be reversed because he entered it solely based upon his counsel's advice. We note that Cullers does not attempt to recant his admission, made during the plea hearing, that he committed the offenses. "A person cannot avoid the legal consequences of his acts even if based on good faith reliance on the advice of counsel. . . . A defendant's subjective hopes and unfulfilled desires, not induced by the court or state, are not good grounds for attacking the resulting plea and sentence." 5
When Cullers was asked his plea as to each count charged against him, he responded that he was agreeing with his counsel. The trial judge then asked Cullers if he understood the charges, clarified Cullers' plea, and asked Cullers if his plea was correct. Cullers did not, at any time, indicate that the plea was incorrect. Accordingly, we find that Cullers' plea was voluntary.
this Court held that the procedural requirements of OCGA 17-7-131
(b) (2) were fulfilled when the defendant's plea was taken and a factual basis for the plea was established. 7
In that case, defense counsel obtained an independent psychiatric report and read the defendant's psychiatric history into the record for the sentencing court's consideration at the plea hearing.
In this case, two psychological evaluations were conducted. The court ordered the first evaluation, and defense counsel requested the second evaluation. The findings from both, which were consistent, were read into the record for the court's consideration at the plea hearing. Thus, we conclude, as we did in Barber, that the requirements of OCGA 17-7-131
(b) (2) were satisfied.
Cullers' final argument is that his plea should be reversed because he was in the Veterans' Hospital in Alabama on the date charged on the indictment, May 12, 1999. "The general rule is that when the exact date of the commission of the crime is not a material allegation of the indictment, the commission of the offense may be proved to have occurred any time within the statute of limitations." 8
In this case, Cullers did not deny the incident. Instead, he informed the court that it happened on May 9, 1999. Thus, the error in the indictment does not warrant the reversal of Cullers' plea. Accordingly, we affirm.