Grady Blackwell pled guilty to three counts of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and one count of trafficking in cocaine. The State filed a Notice of Recidivism pursuant to OCGA 17-10-7 (c), and the court accepted four of the predicate offenses, two convictions for possession of a controlled substance, one conviction for possession with intent to distribute cocaine, and one conviction for criminal attempt to obtain a controlled substance. The court stated that it was sentencing Blackwell under both OCGA 16-13-30 (d) and 17-10-7 (c).

Blackwell claims on appeal that the court erred in sentencing him under both these Code sections because OCGA 16-13-30 (d) prohibits the court from sentencing him under OCGA 17-10-7 (c). We disagree.

OCGA 17-10-7 (c) provides that anyone who has been convicted of three prior felonies must, after being convicted of a subsequent offense, serve the maximum time provided for in his sentence and will not be eligible for parole until he has served the maximum time.

OCGA 16-13-30 (d) provides that anyone convicted of manufacturing, selling, or possessing with intent to distribute a controlled substance as specified in subsection (b) is guilty of a felony and shall be sentenced to not less than five years nor more than thirty years. Upon a second or subsequent conviction, he shall be sentenced to not less than ten years nor more than forty years. This Code section goes on to state: "The provisions of subsection (a) 1 of Code Section 17-10-7 shall not apply to a sentence imposed for a second such offense; provided, however, that the remaining provisions of Code Section 17-10-7 shall apply for any subsequent offense." OCGA 16-13-30 (d).

Here, the court did not sentence Blackwell under OCGA 17-10-7 (a), it sentenced him under OCGA 17-10-7 (c). Nevertheless, Blackwell argues that OCGA 16-13-30 (d) should be interpreted as providing for the remaining sections to apply only to offenses subsequent to the second offense. 2

The statute clearly states that only the provisions of subsection (a) shall not apply to a sentence imposed for a second such offense and also specifically provides that the remaining provisions of Code 17-10-7 shall apply for any subsequent offense. A well-established canon of statutory construction, inclusio unius, exclusio alterius, provides that the inclusion of one implies the exclusion of others. See, e.g., O'Melveny & Myers v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 512 U. S. 79, 86 (114 SC 2048, 2054, 129 LE2d 67) (1994); United States v. Koonce, 991 F2d 693, 698 (11th Cir. 1993) ("The canon of statutory construction that the inclusion of one implies the exclusion of others is well-established.").

Applying this rule to OCGA 16-13-30 (d), we conclude that had the legislature intended for the remaining sections to apply only to offenses subsequent to the second offense, it would not have singled out subsection (a), but would have provided that OCGA 17-10-7 in its entirety would not apply to a second offense under OCGA 16-13-30 (b).

Therefore, we interpret OCGA 16-13-30 (d) as providing that although the court may not sentence second time offenders under both OCGA 16-13-30 (d) and 17-10-7 (a), it may sentence second time offenders under both OCGA 16-13-30 (d) and any remaining provisions of OCGA 17-10-7. Thus, even assuming this was just Blackwell's second offense under OCGA 16-13-30 (b), the trial court was not prohibited from sentencing him under both OCGA 16-13-30 (d) and 17-10-7 (c). There was no error.

Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Bettieanne C. Hart, Tammi R. Simpson, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.