Appellant Joseph L. Eure appeals from the trial court's order granting a motion to compel arbitration and stay pending arbitration filed by appellees Cantrell Properties, Inc. and Kay W. Cantrell. 1 Although we originally granted Eure's application for interlocutory appeal, because we have concluded that this Court lacks jurisdiction, we now dismiss the appeal.

Eure entered into a contract with Cantrell in August 1995 for the construction of a new home. The parties signed a New Construction Purchase and Sale Agreement (the Agreement), in which they acknowledged that a "voluntary 'Binding Arbitration Procedure' " existed under the Georgia Arbitration Code for the resolution of any disputes "provided all parties to this Agreement concur in writing to abide by same." Cantrell did not seek to enforce this provision, but rather moved for arbitration under the language of a limited warranty issued to Eure. Exhibit A to the parties' Agreement reflected that Cantrell would deliver to Eure a Builder Warranty and a Home Buyer Warranty on the property, and further provided that Eure agreed that Cantrell "shall not be liable for any defects not specifically provided for in the warranty. . . ."

In addition to the Agreement, Eure also signed Exhibit C to the Agreement, which stated that he had read the introduction and the limited warranty set out in a booklet entitled "Performance Standards and Supplement to the Real Estate Sale Agreement" (the Booklet) and acknowledged that the Booklet was "an integral part" of the parties' Agreement. The introduction to the Booklet provided that if Eure made a claim for corrective action under the limited warranty and Cantrell failed to take such action, Eure "shall commence Arbitration Proceedings with Construction Arbitration Associates, Ltd. ('CAA') in accordance with its rules and procedures." The introduction also reiterated that the Booklet was incorporated into the parties' Agreement by reference.

The limited warranty itself, Appendix A to the Booklet, provided that if Cantrell failed to make any inspection or tests or failed to respond to any claim made under the warranty, Eure had 30 days "to commence arbitration proceedings with Construction Arbitration Associates, Ltd. ('CAA') in accordance with its procedures and rules." The warranty further provided that if Cantrell failed to correct a defect within a three-month period or if Eure was dissatisfied with the corrective work, then within 30 days Eure "shall commence and diligently pursue arbitration proceedings with the CAA, in accordance with the rules and procedures."

In May 1997 Eure sued Cantrell in Cobb Superior Court for breach of implied and express warranties, negligence and fraud, claiming that numerous construction defects existed in the property. In reliance upon the arbitration provisions found in the limited warranty, Cantrell moved pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 USC 1-16, to compel arbitration of these claims and to stay further proceedings pending arbitration. The trial court granted Cantrell's motion, and this appeal followed.

In support of the motion, Cantrell asserted that the Agreement evidenced a transaction involving interstate commerce in accordance with 9 USC 2. In opposition, Eure contended that the Agreement was controlled by the Georgia Arbitration Code. The trial court granted Cantrell's motion under the FAA and certified the issue for immediate review. However, 16 of the FAA provides that no interlocutory appeal may be had from an order granting a stay of any action pending arbitration or directing an arbitration to proceed under the FAA. 9 USC 16 (b) (1) & (2). 2 Accordingly, if the FAA applies to the parties' Agreement, 16 of the FAA would bar our consideration of this interlocutory appeal. 3

The FAA provides that a "written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 USC 2. In determining whether a contract evidences a transaction involving commerce, federal rules of contract construction and interpretation govern. Primerica Fin. Svc. v. Wise, 217 Ga. App. 36, 37 (1) (456 SE2d 631) (1995); ADC Constr. Co. v. McDaniel Grading, 177 Ga. App. 223, 224 (1) (338 SE2d 733) (1985).

The U. S. Supreme Court has interpreted the phrase "involving commerce" as the functional equivalent of the phrase "affecting commerce" and has found that it "signals [an] intent to exercise [Congress' commerce] powers to the full." Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U. S. 265, 273-275 (III) (115 SC 834, 130 LE2d 753) (1995). Thus, the test under 9 USC 2 is whether "the transaction in fact involve[d] interstate commerce, even if the parties did not contemplate an interstate commerce connection." (Punctuation omitted.) Id. at 281 (IV).

Accordingly, the FAA governs the arbitration agreement between the parties in this case. And because the FAA does not allow an appeal from an interlocutory order granting a motion to compel arbitration and stay pending arbitration, we lack jurisdiction to consider Eure's appeal. 9 USC 16. See also Dakota Wesleyan Univ. v. HPG Intl., 560 NW2d 921, 924 (S. D. 1997) and Long v. Industrial Dev. Bd. of Vincent, 619 S2d 1387, 1388 (Ala. 1993) (each case applying 16 to dismiss appeal of order granting motion to compel arbitration). Cf. SuperPumper, Inc. v. Nerland Oil, 582 NW2d 647 (N. D. 1998) (bringing state appellate rules in accord with 16); Berger Farms v. First Interstate Bank of Oregon, 939 P2d 64 (Or. App. 1997) (holding FAA controls jurisdiction over appeals under FAA where state law conflicts with 16).

Therefore, because this appeal was improvidently granted, it is hereby dismissed.

Chorey, Taylor & Feil, Celeste McCollough, Lisa F. Harper, for appellees.