This appeal involves the issue of the intent required to violate OCGA 16-8-15, conversion of payments for real property-improvements. Fred Thompson III was indicted in Dodge County for violating that statute. He was found guilty after a bench trial, and his motion for new trial was denied. Thompson contends on appeal that the statute requires specific intent to defraud, contrary to the trial court's ruling, and that the State failed to prove that intent beyond a reasonable doubt. We agree, and we reverse Thompson's conviction.

OCGA 16-8-15 (a) provides, in pertinent part, that "[a]ny . . . contractor . . . who with intent to defraud shall use the proceeds of any payment made to him on account of improving certain real property for any other purpose than to pay for labor or service performed on or materials furnished by his order for this specific improvement while any amount for which he may be or become liable for such labor, services, or materials remains unpaid commits a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than five years or upon the recommendation of the jury or in the discretion of the trial judge, punished for a misdemeanor. . . ."

The trial court recognized that this case was "akin . . . to a civil action," and that "[s]ometimes it's a difficult matter to decide what is properly in criminal court and what is properly in civil court." But the trial court reasoned that Thompson was guilty of violating the statute because "it is not the fact Mr. Thompson intended to violate the criminal statute that he is charged with but that he intended to do the act which happens to be against the law. That's the intent that's required." The trial court erred. It is clear that OCGA 16-8-15 requires not only the general intent required in all criminal statutes but also a specific intent to defraud.

Subsection (b) of the statute provides that "[a] failure to pay for material or labor furnished for such property improvements shall be prima-facie evidence of intent to defraud." But the presumption created by the statute is a permissive presumption, not a conclusive one. State v. Hudson, 247 Ga. 36, 38 (273 SE2d 616) (1981). "[T]he duty still devolved upon the state to prove every element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt," id., including the specific intent to defraud. We cannot agree that it did so.