A jury convicted Lonnie Grant of the offenses of misdemeanor possession of marijuana and driving under the influence of alcohol. 1 During the trial, Grant readily admitted having the marijuana on his person but denied driving the car. He claimed that a stranger, whom he had just met, was driving, " 'cause my license is suspended. I don't drive, plus I was drunk." After Grant emphatically declared on cross-examination that "I never drive drunk with a suspended license," the trial court permitted the prosecutor to inquire whether the Department of Public Safety had, in fact, suspended his license. The court sentenced Grant to concurrent 12-month sentences on each count. Held: Grant's sole enumeration of error is that the trial court erred in imposing sentence on him after he raised a challenge to the voluntariness of his prior DUI guilty plea entered nearly a year earlier in another county. He contends that once a defendant raises the issue of whether an intelligent and voluntary waiver was made with respect to a prior guilty plea, the State bears the burden of establishing a valid waiver occurred. Manker v. State, 223 Ga. App. 3, 6 (5) ( 476 SE2d 785) (1996). See Pope v. State, 256 Ga. 195, 209 (17) ( 345 SE2d 831) (1986) (presuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible). Grant's reliance on Pope and Manker is misguided because the prior plea at issue here is a misdemeanor traffic conviction, not a felony. Under OCGA 40-13-33 (a), any challenge to a misdemeanor traffic conviction must be filed within 180 days from when the conviction became final. 2 Brown v. Earp, 261 Ga. 522, 523 ( 407 SE2d 737) (1991). Inasmuch as Grant failed to timely assert a challenge to that conviction, he is barred from collaterally attacking it. Walker v. State, 199 Ga. App. 701, 702-703 ( 405 SE2d 887) (1991). |