Appellee-defendant City of Columbus (City) adopted an ordinance which prohibits private modeling sessions or other sexual displays in one-on-one sessions and close mingling between customers and employees of adult entertainment establishments. Appellant-plaintiffs brought suit challenging the constitutionality of the ordinance. The trial court granted the City's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and appellants appeal. A legislative restriction on adult entertainment must satisfy a tripartite test in order to comport with the free speech guarantees of the federal and state constitutions. Harris v. Entertainment Systems, 259 Ga. 701, 703 (1) (c) ( 386 SE2d 140) (1989). The constitutionality of a law regulating adult entertainment will be upheld only (1) if it furthers an important governmental interest; (2) if that governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of speech; and, (3) if the incidental restriction of speech is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that governmental interest. Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Busbee, 250 Ga. 252, 256 ( 297 SE2d 250) (1982). On the City's motion to dismiss under OCGA 9-11-12 (b) (6), appellants' pleadings must be construed most favorably for them and all doubt resolved in their favor. Alford v. Pub. Svc. Comm., 262 Ga. 386, fn. 1 ( 418 SE2d 13) (1992). Applying that standard, appellants' pleadings raise a justiciable issue as to whether the ordinance furthers an important governmental interest which is unrelated to free speech. In support of its motion to dismiss, the City produced no evidence showing that the ordinance furthers such an important governmental interest. In Discotheque, Inc. v. City Council of Augusta, 264 Ga. 623 (449 SE2d 608) (1994), we held that it was error to grant summary judgment upholding the constitutionality of an ordinance regulating adult entertainment in the absence of such evidence. Accordingly, the grant of the City's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim must be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. FLETCHER, Justice, concurring. I concur in the judgment because of this court's decision in Discotheque, Inc. v. City Council of Augusta, 264 Ga. 623 (449 SE2d 608) (1994). Since that case requires a city to present more evidence of a content-neutral purpose than the ordinance's preamble, the Columbus ordinance did not have even a preamble explaining the city's reasons for passing the ordinance, and the City of Columbus moved to dismiss the complaint without producing any evidence, I agree that Quetgles states a claim for which relief may be granted. Playtime Theatres, 475 U. S. 41, 49-50 (106 SC 925, 89 LE2d 29) (1986). Based on the theory of "legislative notice," a city council may rely on the findings and experiences of other governmental bodies in enacting ordinances regulating adult entertainment establishments. 2 Since the concerns expressed in the preamble to the Augusta ordinance are not arbitrary, irrational or speculative and the predominate reason for its passage was the reduction of adverse secondary effects, I now conclude that the Augusta ordinance was a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction on the protected expression of barroom nude dancing. 2. Because of the procedural posture of this case, our decision today reversing the judgment in favor of the City of Columbus does not address the constitutionality of the regulation banning private booths in lingerie modeling studios. State, cities, and counties may prohibit closed booths in sexually oriented businesses, whether they are video arcades, adult bookstores, or lingerie modeling studios, as a reasonable manner regulation on free speech. "[A]ll federal courts that have addressed this issue have unanimously upheld the open-booth requirement as a valid exercise of state police powers." See Mitchell v. Comm. on Adult Entertainment Establishments, 10 F3d 123, 143 (3rd Cir. 1993) (listing eleven cases from six courts of appeal); see also City of Lincoln v. ABC Books, 238 Neb. 378 (470 NW2d 760) (1991) (upholding the constitutionality of ordinance that prohibited enclosed or concealed booths in picture arcades). The government can eliminate closed booths based on its interest in reducing crime, preventing public sexual activity, maintaining public health, and protecting adjacent properties from deterioration. 33. Nor does the court's decision today address what type of evidence is required in a summary judgment proceeding and whether the evidence must have been presented to the legislative body when en- serve alcohol and also allow and/or encourage nudity. To that end, this Ordinance is hereby adopted. Ordinance No. 5643. acting the ordinance. The safer position for cities and counties that wish to adopt constitutional regulations is to assume that the governing body must have some evidence of the relationship between the proposed regulation of adult entertainment establishments and the asserted government interest at the time of enactment. The decision to enact such a regulation constitutes a legislative determination that closed booth showings produce side effects that are destructive of public health, decency and order. To have this determination sustained against constitutional attack, a legislature is not bound to create an evidentiary record that would pass muster on plenary judicial review of legislation's necessity and fitness to achieve desired results. Judicial review goes only to whether the legislative determination of justification and fitness is not facially without factual support, hence not arbitrary and capricious. Wall Distributors v. City of Newport News, 782 F2d 1165, 1169 (4th Cir. 1986). Thus, courts have concluded that statements of citizens and government officials; correspondence from citizens' associations council members, and a state's attorney; and untranscribed testimony at public hearings and meetings about the adverse effects of adult bookstores was sufficient evidence of secondary effects under Renton to withstand a constitutional challenge to the ordinance. 4 Given the role of judicial review in these cases, I do not think that this court need adopt any more stringent standard on the sufficiency of the evidence than required by other courts in reviewing open-booth requirements. I am authorized to state that Justice Hunstein joins in this concurrence. SEARS, Justice, concurring. I agree with the majority that the trial court's judgment must be reversed. I write to emphasize two points. First, the majority opinion does not address several issues raised by the appellants that do not relate to the First Amendment issue on which the Court reverses. As to those issues, the Court's silence does not amount to an affirmance of the trial court's ruling on them. Instead, by reversing the grant of the motion to dismiss, this Court has effectively reinstated the appellants' complaint. Second, with regard to the City of Columbus's burden to produce evidence of secondary effects of appellants' adult entertainment establishments, I write to emphasize that for the city's ordinance to pass constitutional muster the city must have relied on that evidence "in passing the municipal ordinance." Discotheque, Inc. v. City Council of Augusta, 264 Ga. 623, 624 ( 449 SE2d 608) (1994). I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Hunt joins in this concurrence. Eugene H. Polleys, Jr., for appellees. | 
