Appellant was convicted of malice murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. 1
He appeals, questioning the content of the re-charge given by the trial court in response to a question from the jury.
1. The State presented evidence that appellant, armed with a gun, stopped his brother-in-law's car which was being driven by a friend of appellant, and ordered the three occupants to exit the vehicle. After telling the three men not to run, appellant fought with the driver and then fired four or five shots in rapid succession at the victim, one of the passengers who was running from the scene. The victim was struck in the back by a bullet which pierced a lung, his pulmonary artery, and his heart, and caused him to bleed to death. The evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude that appellant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of malice murder. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).
2. The trial court charged the jury on the law of malice murder, voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter. In response to an inquiry from the deliberating jury, the trial court reiterated its instructions on involuntary manslaughter after initially misstating that it was defining voluntary manslaughter. 2
Appellant contends the misstatement resulted in a confusing charge that requires reversal. However, appellate review of the issue is procedurally barred in light of the trial court's request for objections to the recharge and appellant's failure to state an objection or reserve the right to object on motion for new trial or on appeal. Rivers v. State, 250 Ga. 303 (7) (298 SE2d 1) (1982)
3. Appellant next contends the trial court erred when, at the conclusion of the recharge, it rejected appellant's suggestion that the jury be informed that firing a gun constituted an unlawful act that could serve as the underlying misdemeanor supporting the possible involuntary manslaughter verdict. It is within the trial court's discretion to determine the need, breadth, and formation of additional jury instructions, and the decision to give additional instructions which addressed only the jury's specific question is not an abuse of discretion. Peebles v. State, 260 Ga. 165
(5a) (391 SE2d 639
Spencer Lawton, Jr., District Attorney, Angela M. Hinton, Assistant District Attorney, Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Susan V. Boleyn, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Paige M. Reese, Staff Attorney, for appellee.