April Davis was injured on February 26, 1990 when a heater exploded at her workplace. She filed suit on February 26, 1992, against her employer, who was later dismissed, and DESA International, Inc., the manufacturer of the heater. The trial court granted DESA's motion to dismiss the action based on the statute of limitation, and Davis appeals.
After a hearing on DESA's motion, the trial court entered an order finding that the appropriate statute of limitation was OCGA 9-3-33
, and since no tolling occurred under either OCGA 9-3-90
or OCGA 9-3-91
, the action was barred.
Contrary to appellee's argument, this case does not fall within the exception in OCGA 1-3-1
(d) (3) for "time period computations specifically applying to other laws." OCGA 9-3-33
does not itself provide for any method of computing the two-year period provided therein. The judicially created rule, exemplified by cases such as Reese, supra, under which the day the injury occurred was included in the computation, was based not on any particular method of computation specifically applying to the statute of limitation, but on the method of computation provided in the general time computation rule included in the predecessor statute to OCGA 1-3-1
(d) (3). The 1985 amendment expressly changed that method. See Loveless v. Grooms, 180 Ga. App. 424 (349 SE2d 281) (1986)
; Hollingsworth, supra. Since Davis initiated her action within the two-year period contemplated by OCGA 9-3-33
, using the computation method mandated by OCGA 1-3-1
(d) (3), as amended, it was timely. The trial court erred in dismissing her complaint.