1  It is plain that the last sentence authorizes trading and swapping only for the properties identified in the preceding sentences. "Words, like people, are judged by the company they keep. Noscitur a sociis. [Cit.] The critical phrase . . . thus must be gauged by the words surrounding it. . . ." Anderson v. Southeastern Fidelity Ins. Co., 251 Ga. 556 (307 SE2d 499) (1983).

2  The act of 1978 (Ga. L. 1978, pp. 890, 891, amending Code Ann. 69-315; now codified as OCGA 36-37-6 (b)) retained the above paragraph, amending it in part as follows:[T]he governing authority of any municipal corporation is hereby authorized to sell personal property belonging to the municipal corporation with an estimated value of $500 or less and lots from any municipal cemetery, regardless of value, without regard to the foregoing provisions of this Section.

3  For many decades, common law principles have restricted severely the alienation of dedicated public lands. Common law authorities include the following:(a) Mayor &c. of Macon v. Franklin, 12 Ga. 239 (1852):A dedication of land to public use is in the nature of an estoppel in pais, and where an attempt is made by the proprietor to revoke it by a sale of the land, he may be enjoined by any person interested in the use. [Id. at 239, hn. 5.]When a dedication is made by a Town or City, it enures to the benefit of all who are at the time, or may afterwards become citizens of the corporation. [Id. at 239, hn. 6.](b) Kirkland v. Johnson, 209 Ga. 824 (76 SE2d 396) (1953):As a general rule, property held by a municipality for governmental or public uses can not be sold without express legislative authority, but must be devoted to the use and purpose for which it was intended. [Id. at 825, hn. 1.](c) Norton v. City of Gainesville, 211 Ga. 387 (86 SE2d 234) (1955):There appears from the authorities to be a clear distinction between property purchased by a municipal corporation and held for use by it as an entity, or in its proprietary capacity, and property purchased by the city for the public use and benefit of its citizens. The title and power of disposition of property acquired for strictly corporate purposes and held in its proprietary capacity, are different from its title to property acquired for and dedicated to the public use of its inhabitants. As to the former, the power to dispose is unquestioned, but as to the latter, in the absence of express legislative authority, it is only where the public use has been abandoned or the property has become unsuitable or inadequate for the purpose to which it was dedicated that the city has power to dispose of such property. [Id. at 390.](d) City Council of Augusta v. Newsome, 211 Ga. 899 (89 SE2d 485) (1955):"As a general rule, a municipality has no power to convey or sell land dedicated as a public park, square or common." [Cits.] [Id. at 899, hn. 1.] . . .[T]he only purported abandonment of said property was by resolution of the Mayor and Council of the City of Augusta, adopted after the filing of the petition before the court, in which it was provided that said property is hereby abandoned as a park and shall no longer be used for park purposes and shall be sold to Sears, Roebuck & Company (for private purposes). . . . [Id., hn. 2.]See also McQuillin, Mun. Corp. 28.38 (3d ed.) (1990 revised volume):A municipal corporation cannot sell or dispose of property devoted to a public governmental use or purpose, . . . without special statutory or charter authority, since as to governmental functions the municipality is a mere agent of the state and subject to control by the state legislative authorities. For instance, property may not be sold where it has been acquired or dedicated for public use as a common, or as a park. . . . In this sense all property is public which has been dedicated to public use, or which may be affected by a public trust, either general or special. Municipal corporations hold all property in which the public is interested, such as . . . parks . . . in trust for the use of the public; and, on principle, such trust property can be disposed of by the municipality only in accordance with the terms of the trust, i.e., in the public interest as declared by statute.

4  See Whaley v. State, 260 Ga. 384, 385 (393 SE2d 681) (1990):As provided in OCGA 1-1-2, the enactment of the official Code was intended to resolve conflicts which existed in the law and to repeal those laws which had become obsolete, which had been declared unconstitutional or invalid, or which had been superseded by the enactment of later laws. [Id. at 385.]In Stepperson, Inc. v. Long, 256 Ga. 838, 844 (353 SE2d 461) (1987), we applied this Code section, holding specifically that a statute in question "was obsolete both because of the passage of time and the constitutional principles announced in Orr v. Orr, 440 U. S. 268 (99 SC 1102, 59 LE2d 306) (1979)." See also Porter v. State, 168 Ga. App. 703 (309 SE2d 919) (1983).

5  This rule appears in the Code of Georgia of 1861, 5 (9th). It was applied as recently as Sizemore v. State, 262 Ga. 214 (416 SE2d 500) (1992).

6  Note that Ga. L. 1956, pp. 22-23, once provided:Any general or local law to the contrary notwithstanding, the State or any municipal corporation, county or other political subdivision thereof, shall have authority to sell, lease, grant, exchange or otherwise dispose of any property or interest therein comprising parks . . . or other property which has been dedicated to a public use for recreational or park purposes, or has been dedicated to a public use for recreational or park purposes by a private citizen, corporation, or association, and thereafter acquired by the State . . . without regard to whether said public use has been previously abandoned, or that said property has become unsuitable or inadequate for the purpose for which originally dedicated, said disposition to be on such terms and conditions as may be deemed desirable or necessary. Provided, however, that any lease under this Act shall be for a period not to exceed 5 years. [Emphasis supplied.] This act was repealed by Ga. L. 1958, pp. 116-117.

7  See the concurring opinion of then Justice Clarke in Dept. of Transp. v. City of Atlanta, 255 Ga. 124 (337 SE2d 327) (1985):The literal method simply dictates that we not depart from the plain meaning of the language of the statute. The golden rule method would direct that we follow the literal method unless it produces contradiction, absurdity or such an inconvenience as to insure that the legislature meant something else. [Id. at 137.]

8  It may be of more than antiquarian interest to note that an act of the General Assembly of 1788 authorized the city commissioners of Brunswick:to sell at public vendue, at such times and places as they shall think proper, all or any of the vacant lots in the said town (except such as were originally reserved for the public use). . . . [Emphasis supplied.] [Watkins Digest, 381.]Additionally, an act of 1796 recited:And whereas, several persons have at sundry times made attempts to run up the commons of the said towns, but have often been defeated, in the caveat courts of the said county, by the exertions of some of the proprietors of the said towns of Brunswick and Frederica: Be it enacted, That any person or persons who may attempt to run any part of the said commons or towns of Brunswick and Frederica, under any pretense whatsoever, shall be liable to a fine of five hundred dollars, . . . [Watkins Digest, 599.]The term of the 1796 Act ("run up") has lost its currency. The Oxford English Dictionary offers (among many usages of "run") this: "to allow to run or feed at large, to graze (cattle, sheep, etc.)." ad. loc., 902a. For "run up" it suggests: "to build, erect, set up (a wall, etc.)." ad. loc., 907c. While its exact meaning remains obscure, the term likely involved the diversion of some aspect of public lands to some kind of private use.By an act of 1797, the General Assembly authorized the sale of a portion of the commons of Brunswick "after three months' public notice in one of the gazettes of Savannah. . . ." Marbury & Crawford's Digest, 160.Since our earliest days, then, it has been the General Assembly that has authorized the sale of municipal park lands.

9  Although the common law authorities cited in footnote three of the majority opinion prohibit a municipality from conveying land dedicated as a public park without express legislative authority, OCGA 36-37-6 provides the necessary legislative authority to a municipal corporation to sell or dispose of property devoted to public use.

10  Despite the majority opinion's warning of the "bizarre possibility" of a trade of city hall for a goat, such a trade would be an abuse of the city commission's discretion. See OCGA 36-30-2; see also Goodman v. City of Atlanta, 246 Ga. 79, 80 (268 SE2d 663) (1980) (city authorities may not exercise their power in a capricious and arbitrary manner). The requirement that the exchange meet the best interest of the municipality limits the trades that a city may make.