After a jury trial, appellant was found guilty of obstruction of an officer and he appeals from the judgment of conviction and sentence entered on the jury's guilty verdict.
"A motion for a continuance predicated on the basis that counsel has not had sufficient time to prepare for trial addresses itself to the sound discretion of the trial judge, and a ruling denying such a motion will not be interfered with unless the judge has abused his discretion in denying the motion. [Cit.] 'The conduct of the party is obviously relevant and is a proper consideration for the judge in the exercise of his discretion. (Cit.) The reason for this is to prevent a party from using . . . employment of counsel as a dilatory tactic.' [Cit.] In the instant case we find no abuse of the trial court's discretion in denying the motion for continuance." Cantrell v. State, 154 Ga. App. 725
-726 (2) (270 SE2d 12
) (1980). " 'The (appellant), not the [S]tate, is chargeable with the delay in such a situation, absent a showing of why the late employment of counsel occurred.' [Cit.]" Cantrell v. State, supra at 726 (2). Thus, "[i]t cannot be said as a matter of law that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling the motion [on this ground]. [Cits.]" Barber v. State, 120 Ga. App. 666
-667 (1) (171 SE2d 747
) (1969). See also McLendon v. State, 123 Ga. App. 290
(2a) (180 SE2d 567
2. Appellant's counsel also moved for a continuance on the ground "that the State on Friday[, September 14, 1990,] had given [him] notification [of] four new witnesses. . . ." The denial of the motion for a continuance on this ground is enumerated as error.
The record contains no demand made by appellant pursuant to OCGA 17-7-110
. Coleman v. State, 124 Ga. App. 313
-314 (1) (183 SE2d 608
) (1971). However, even assuming that a demand had been made, "[t]here is no merit to appellant's contention that the trial court should have granted a continuance after the [S]tate gave him a supplemental list of [four] witnesses. [According to appellant,] [o]nly [two] of these witnesses testified and did so [four] days after [receipt of the supplemental list]. [Cit.]" Jones v. State, 247 Ga. 268
, 271 (3) (275 SE2d 67
) (1981). Appellant's counsel did not ask for additional time to interview the witnesses, " 'did not claim to be unfairly surprised by [the supplemental list] and did not allege prejudice of any kind from the fact that the notification was [four days prior to trial]. Under these circumstances any defect in the failure of the prosecution to [provide a timely] written list of witnesses is harmless. (Cit.)' [Cits.]" Griffin v. State, 183 Ga. App. 386
, 388 (3) (358 SE2d 917