Plaintiff Aaron Talbert appeals the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant Allstate. Talbert sought recovery of damages for abusive litigation under OCGA 51-7-80 et seq. Talbert had brought an action for damages for personal injuries arising out of an automobile collision against Betty Jean Foskey, who was insured by Allstate.

During the course of discovery Talbert had moved for summary judgment in the underlying suit on the issue of Foskey's negligence, but the motion was denied. At trial the court granted Talbert's motion for directed verdict, finding that Foskey was negligent as a matter of law.

After entry of judgment for Talbert against Foskey, Talbert sued to recover damages for Allstate asserting a defense without substantial justification. Allstate answered and moved for summary judgment, contending that it was entitled to prevail as a matter of law. After a hearing, without stating a basis for its ruling, the trial court granted Allstate's motion. Talbert contends that the reasons advanced by Allstate for granting its motion for summary judgment are not sustainable.

1. The first basis is that an abusive litigation claim against Allstate does not lie under OCGA 51-7-80 et seq. because Allstate was not a party to the original tort action. Allstate predicates its argument on the fact that a Yost v. Torok, 256 Ga. 92 (344 SE2d 414) (1986), claim is confined to "any party." Id. at 96.

The unambiguous language of the Code section eliminates this assertion. OCGA 51-7-81 provides: "Any person who takes an active part in the initiation, continuation, or procurement of civil proceedings against another shall be liable for abusive litigation if such person acts: (1) with malice; and (2) [w]ithout substantial justification." "Person" includes a corporation or any entity with capacity to sue or be sued. OCGA 51-7-80 (6). "[W]ithout substantial justification" refers to a defense which is frivolous, groundless in fact or in law, or vexatious. OCGA 51-7-80 (7).

Considering the entire tenor of Article 5 of Title 51, Chapter 7, it is evident that the law encompasses the type of activity that Allstate engaged in during the original action. It took an active part in the continuation of the proceedings and thus could be named as defendant in an abusive litigation claim.

2. The second basis for granting summary judgment was that the notice given was not sufficient under OCGA 51-7-84 (1) (a). That Code section requires as a condition precedent to the maintenance of an abusive litigation claim that the party against whom the claim is to be asserted be given written notice by registered or certified mail or other means evidencing receipt by the "addressee." The stated purpose is to give the prospective defendant to the abusive litigation claim an opportunity to voluntarily withdraw his defense or position.

All three letters, which Talbert contends constituted notice, were addressed to the attorney for Foskey. Only the middle one, dated July 11, 1989, referred to Allstate and then specifically to its claims adjuster, who was described as "acting as an agent of" Allstate. The letter termed the denial of negligence as being for "a wrongful purpose and without substantial justification," but never mentioned that it was given as notice under OCGA 51-7-84 (a).

These new code provisions create an exclusive remedy which replaces the antecedent actions. OCGA 51-7-85. A paramount consideration of OCGA 51-7-84 (a) is that the notice be given specifically to the "addressee." Here, Allstate as one who took "an active part" but was not an actual party, was entitled to be particularly specified in the letter as the one against whom Talbert would seek damages if the position of lack of negligence were not withdrawn or dismissed. The law is strictly construed in order to accomplish its overriding purpose to give a prospective defendant the chance to change position and avoid liability, OCGA 51-7-82. See Heard v. Neighbor Newspapers, 259 Ga. 458, 459 (5) (383 SE2d 553) (1989); National Indem. Co. v. Tatum, 193 Ga. App. 698, 700 (388 SE2d 896) (1989).

Talbert failed to specify Allstate as the one against whom Talbert would seek relief unless the defenses of no negligence or negligence on the part of others were withdrawn or disavowed. As a result, the letters did not meet the prerequisite of notice under the Code section.

Barrow, Sims, Morrow & Lee, Jordan D. Morrow, for appellee.