The appellant, Lashundra Peavy, appeals from her conviction for the malice murder of Arthur Turner. 1
On appeal her sole contention is that she received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. We affirm.
1. Having reviewed the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found Peavy guilty of malice murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).
2. In her only enumeration of error Peavy contends that she received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. In this regard, she contends that counsel's performance was deficient because counsel failed to specifically except to certain portions of the trial court's jury charge or to reserve the right to do so later and because counsel failed to have the voir dire and opening statements recorded. Peavy further contends that several of the trial court's charges were erroneous and that she was prejudiced thereby. 2
To establish that there has been actual ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense.
In the instant case, we need not evaluate whether counsel's performance was deficient, because we conclude that Peavy has failed to establish that counsel's performance was prejudicial. 3
Wadley v. State, 258 Ga. 465
, 466 (369 SE2d 734
) (1988). In this regard, when a defendant raises an ineffectiveness claim based on counsel's failure to except to certain jury charges or to preserve the right to do so on appeal, the defendant must show that the charges in question were erroneous and that, if proper charges had been given, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different. Id. at 466-467. Having examined each of the jury charges that Peavy contends were erroneous, we conclude that most of the charges were not erroneous and that, even assuming that others were erroneous, Peavy has failed to establish that there is a reasonable probability that proper charges would have affected the result of the trial. Id. at 466-467.