This appeal raises an important issue: whether the entry of a superior court order 1 was legally sufficient to authorize a magistrate to serve as a superior court judge. 1. Article VI, Sec. I, Par. III of the Constitution of Georgia of 1983 provides: Provided the judge is otherwise qualified, a judge may exercise judicial power in any court upon the request and with the consent of the judges of that court and of the judge's own court under rules prescribed by law. The term "judge," as used in this article, shall include Justices, judges, senior judges, magistrates, and every other such judicial office of whatever name existing or created. 2. There is a serious doubt that the purported appointment by a single judge is equivalent to designation "upon the request and with the consent of the judges of that court and of the judge's own court under rules prescribed by law." (Emphasis supplied.) 3. However, because there was no objection to the appointment of the magistrate to sit as a superior court judge prior to the commencement of the divorce trial upon which this appeal is based, this issue is not preserved for appellate review. 4. As a result of our holding above, we need not address the appellant's remaining assertions of error. Glennville Haldi, for appellant. | 
