lawskills
Google
search the Web search LawSkills.com
Did you know you can download our entire database for free?


Resources
[more] 

Georgia Caselaw:
Browse
Greatest Hits

Georgia Code: Browse

(external) Findlaw Georgia Law Resources


This site exists because of donors like you.

Thanks!


Lawskills.com Georgia Caselaw
UPTON v. CITY OF ATLANTA.
S90A0790.
WELTNER, Justice.
Atlanta City Code 14-9012 (g). Atlanta Municipal Court. Before Judge Johnson.
Upton, an employee of a wrecker service, was convicted of violation of Atlanta City Code 14-9012 (g), which provides:
It shall be unlawful for any wrecker service to operate within the city without employing the services of a check approval agency and the major credit card services; and it shall be unlawful to refuse to accept, in lieu of cash, any check which can be insured by a check approval agency or any major credit card, for the payment of any or all fees and storage of the impounded vehicle.
The evidence shows that Upton's employer regularly accepts payment for services by the tender of checks that are approved by its check approval agency; and that Upton refused to receive a draft that was drawn on a credit union as payment for towing and storage fees.
1. (a) Upton contends that the requirement that wrecker services accept payments by check violates Art. I, Sec. VIII of the United States Constitution because it effects a change in legal tender; and that the ordinance violates Art. IX, Sec. II, Par. II of the Constitution of Georgia of 1983 because it is ultra vires the home rule powers conferred upon the city by OCGA 36-35-6 (a) et seq.
(b) Both of these arguments were rejected in Porter v. City of Atlanta, 259 Ga. 526, 527, 529 (2) (384 SE2d 631) (1989).
2. (a) Upton insists that his refusal to receive a draft drawn on a credit union in payment of charges was not an act proscribed by the ordinance. OCGA 11-3-104 (2) (b) defines the term "check" as "a draft drawn on a bank and payable on demand." (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA 7-1-4 (7) provides in part that the term " 'bank' shall not include a credit union."
(b) Because the drawee of the instrument in question was not a bank, Upton's refusal to accept it in payment of charges was not a violation of the ordinance. His conviction, therefore, must be set aside.
Raines Carter, Solicitor, for appellee.
Rubin & Wildau, Martin H. Rubin, for appellant.
DECIDED JUNE 8, 1990.
Friday November 21 13:26 CST


This site exists because of donors like you.

Thanks!


Valid HTML 4.0!

Valid CSS!





Home - Tour - Disclaimer - Privacy - Contact Us
Copyright © 2000,2002,2004 Lawskills.com