Fitch appeals from the judgment against him following a bench trial in an action to recover a deficiency resulting from the repossession of an automobile purchased by Fitch.

Fitch complains that the trial court erred in finding that plaintiff GMAC had properly calculated the pro rata rebate of unearned finance charges due him on the three-year contract. He asserts that the calculation violated OCGA 10-1-33 so that the penalty provisions of OCGA 10-1-38 barred recovery by GMAC of the finance charge, delinquency and collection charges.

$1,799.52 Total finance charges due on contract

49.986 Pro rata interest per installment ($1,799.52 divided by 36)

$1,549.57 Number of unmatured installments times pro rata interest per installment (31 x 49.986)."

The evidence was supportive.

Fitch argues that the rebate on the monthly installment contract must be computed on a daily rather than a monthly basis, that is, the total number of days in the contract proportioned to the date of acceleration. By this daily method, appellant derives a rebate of unearned finance charges in the amount of $1,595.81, a difference of $46.24 from the amount of $1,549.57 calculated by GMAC on the basis of the unmatured monthly installments.

To begin with, appellant has provided no authority for his proposition that a daily calculation is required by the statute. Rebate of unearned finance charges on a monthly basis is proportionate to and consistent with the terms of the contract and harmonious with provisions of the Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act, OCGA 10-1-30 et seq. See, e.g., OCGA 10-1-33 (b); 10-1-34. Furthermore, such a method of daily rather than monthly calculation in this situation of a monthly installment contract would be pragmatically contrary to reasonable commercial practices. For example, an offer of 10/30 of a month's installment payment on the 10th of the month would not be accepted by a creditor as a timely 1/3 payment. Installments are not fractionable.

Appellant's argument, though creative, does not persuade us that the trial court erred in entering a judgment in favor of GMAC for an amount determined by the disputed monthly method of calculation. Moreover, "[i]n a bench trial the court sits as the trier of fact and his findings 'shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous . . .' [Cit.] The 'clearly erroneous' test is the same as the 'any evidence rule.' [Cit.] Thus, an appellate court will not disturb fact findings of a trial court if there is any evidence to sustain them. [Cit.]" Allen v. Cobb Heating &c. Co., 158 Ga. App. 209, 210 (279 SE2d 505) (1981).

Carolyn S. Weeks, for appellant.