Daughtry appeals from his conviction of aggravated assault and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.
(a) provides, in pertinent part: "A person commits the offense of aggravated assault when he assaults: . . . (2) With a deadly weapon . . . which, when used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury." The facts here establish clearly that appellant committed an act with a deadly weapon which placed Carter in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury. This is sufficient to support the charge of aggravated assault. Chastain v. State, 163 Ga. App. 678
, 680 (3) (296 SE2d 69
) (1982). There is no requirement that a victim be actually injured and the crime is complete without proof of injury. Clark v. State, 149 Ga. App. 641
, 644 (2) (255 SE2d 110
) (1979). An unloaded gun pointed at another in a threatening manner is a deadly weapon. Adsitt v. State, 248 Ga. 237
, 240 (6) (282 SE2d 305
) (1981). Although in every assault there must be an intent to injure, the question of criminal intention is for the jury and will not be disturbed by this court unless it is contrary to the evidence and clearly erroneous. Riddle v. State, 145 Ga. App. 328
, 330-331 (1) (243 SE2d 607
) (1978). The jury's finding here is neither contrary to the evidence nor clearly erroneous. Hence, we find the evidence sufficient to meet the standard of proof required by Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560).
2. Appellant contends the trial court erred by charging the jury that having a weapons permit was not a defense to the charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.
(b) provides that a person who has been convicted of a felony and who possesses a firearm commits a felony. Appellant testified that he obtained a license from the Probate Court of Mitchell County to carry the pistol involved here and thus, believed he was authorized to carry the pistol. However, the only exceptions to the provisions of OCGA 16-11-131
(b) are set forth in OCGA 16-11-131
(c) and (d), neither of which authorizes a convicted felon to possess a firearm merely because he obtains a license to do so from a state probate court. Thus, the trial court's charge that "the fact that a convicted felon obtains a license to carry a pistol is no defense to a charge of being a Convicted Felon in Possession of a Firearm" was correct.
The court also correctly charged the jury that intent is an essential element of any crime, and that criminal intent does not mean an intention to violate the law or a penal statute, but means an intention to commit the act statutorily prohibited. OCGA 16-2-1
; Schwerdtfeger v. State, 167 Ga. App. 19
, 20 (1) (305 SE2d 834
) (1983). Hence, no error or confusion resulted from the trial court's charge, and appellant's contention to the contrary is without merit.