1  The following colloquy transpired:"The Court: What is the verdict under the breach of contract claim?Foreperson: We did not go into that. We figured that fraud was the one --The Court: All right. So you did not make any determination on the breach of contract claim?Foreperson: No, we didn't.The Court: You did not have deliberations on the breach of contract claim?The Foreperson: We thought we were supposed to choose one."After the jury left, the judge asked both parties if they thought there needed to be any findings on the breach of contract count. Gesner's attorney stated "I think they did the right thing when they said one or the other."In this connection, see Stone v. Stone, 258 Ga. 716 (373 SE2d 627) (1988), specifically n. 1, as follows: "We have suggested on several occasions that jury verdicts that include inappropriate terms or ambiguities be resubmitted for amendment or clarification."

2  Although the court ordered Gesner to pay the costs of preparing the record, the order upon remittitur shows that Ketcham's attorney paid the costs. Gesner asserts that he assumed that the case would be retried on the breach of contract claim, but the trial court apparently considered the case at an end. Gesner claims that he did not receive notice of the trial court's final order until after the expiration of 30 days.

3  See also Schley v. Schofield, 61 Ga. 528, 530 (1878): "As a general rule, where the writ of error is founded upon a trial below in which both law and fact were involved, and where the complaint is that the plaintiff in error lost his case when he was entitled to gain it, and where this court is of opinion that he was entitled to gain it, and where, for that reason, the judgment of the court below is reversed, a new trial follows unless this court, by way of direction, dictates something else. . . . [A] judgment of this court as well as that of any other, ought to be clear and certain. When more than a mere reversal is intended, the additional matter should not be stated simply by way of a reason for the reversal. . ., but there should be a mandatory direction to do or to adjudge whatever this court intends shall be done or adjudged."

4  This controversy stems from the plain fact that Ketcham sold to Gesner a forged painting. At the time, Gesner wrote to Ketcham: "I would much prefer to settle this matter in a gentlemanly fashion and what I need from you is your check for $10,000 representing the commission you made on the transaction and I need the name and address of the man from whom you acquired the painting. It is my intention to go after him for the remaining $22,500." Gesner received neither a check nor the identity and location of Ketcham's supplier, although he made additional requests for information during discovery. Had Ketcham been willing to "settle this matter in a gentlemanly fashion" and repaid the $10,000 that Gesner requested of him nine years ago, the prodigious quantum of personal and public resources wasted by this tortured case would have been avoided.Justice should not be so illusive a goal for so plain a claim of right.