The State prosecuted four truckdrivers for operating vehicles in excess of sixty feet, as prohibited by OCGA 32-6-24. They filed general demurrers, challenging the constitutionality of the statute on various grounds. The trial court sustained the demurrers on every ground. Equal Protection 1. The present statute establishing length limits (OCGA 32-6-24) provides that "no vehicle or combination of vehicles and load shall exceed a total length of 60 feet" unless it is exempt, as follows: (a) The length limitation of 60 feet does not apply to the operation of farming, agricultural, or forest management equipment under specified conditions within a 40-mile radius of the property of the owner. OCGA 32-6-25. 1(b) Total lengths -- i.e., combination of vehicles and loads -- exceeding 60 feet are permitted in the following instances: (1) certain loads of single length pieces, unless the total length of vehicle and load exceeds 75 feet, in which event a single trip permit is required; 2 (2) vehicles transporting motor vehicles, or, automobile carriers; however 65 feet shall be the limit; 3 (3) combination of vehicle and load transporting live poultry no longer than 65 feet; 4 (4) combination of vehicle and load of fiat-bed van carriers not exceeding 63 feet in length. 5 OCGA 32-6-24 (b). (c) The Department of Transportation may issue, upon application, permits in writing authorizing the applicant to operate on public roads vehicles with lengths exceeding 60 feet upon a showing of certain specified conditions. OCGA 32-6-28. 2. OCGA 32-6-24 is part of the Georgia Code of Public Transportation, whose stated purpose is "to provide for the administration, financing, construction, maintenance, and operation of an adequate and integrated system of public roads and other modes of transportation in Georgia so that the safety, convenience and interests of the various modes of public transportation and the public will be promoted and served. . . ." Ga. L. 1973, p. 947. (Emphasis supplied.) 3. We have asserted on many occasions that "[i]n the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect. If the classification has some 'reasonable basis,' it does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification 'is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.' [Cit.]" However, the essential of any such classification is that it bear a direct and real relation to the object or purpose of the legislation. See, e.g., Lasseter v. Ga. Public Service Comm., 253 Ga. 227, 230-1 ( 319 SE2d 824) (1984). 4. OCGA 32-6-24 (b) (2) exempts certain loads that are single length pieces. OCGA 32-6-24 (b) (3), (4), and (5) exempt trucks used in different industries from the length requirements, according to their specific use. The inquiry thus becomes whether this classification is "reasonable" within the meaning of our standards for constitutionality, bearing in mind that the legislative warrant for the act is the public safety. 5. We cannot say that there is no rational basis for the exemptions for single length piece loads, for automobile carriers, and for fiat-bed van carriers. The General Assembly may have found these provisions essential to the competitive and efficient transportation of those commodities. 6 We are unable, however, to understand how it can be that the transport of general freight in units longer than sixty feet is a threat to public safety, whereas a truck transporting live poultry is only a threat to public safety when its length exceeds sixty-five feet. 76. This absence of a rational basis for distinction leaves us confronted with a dilemma. (a) The truckdrivers, because they are not hauling live poultry, are facing prosecution for exceeding the length limit. It is thus fully apparent that, as compared to haulers of live poultry, they are denied the equal protection that our constitution demands. 8 On the record of this case, we are unable to uphold the validity of the exemption contained in OCGA 32-6-24 (b) (4). (b) Under such a circumstance, OCGA 1-1-3 creates a presumption of severability, and, ordinarily, the exemption would be stricken. 9 That, however, seems a harsh course for persons who are currently transporting live poultry in units complying with the extended total length limits authorized by the statute -- and particularly so, as no one of them is a party to this appeal. 7. Accordingly, rather than to excise the exemption for haulers of live poultry, the relief granted to these defendants is limited to declaring that the enforcement of total length limits -- i.e., combination of vehicle and load -- for general freight transport that are different from those total length limits enforced as to live poultry transport is violative of the Georgia Constitution. Delegation of Authority 8. OCGA 32-6-24 (a) (2) specifies exceptions for oversized vehicles on "fully limited access highways designed to National System of Interstate and Defense Highways standards." The statute also authorizes the Department to designate any other street, road, or highway for oversized vehicles "to provide reasonable access requirements in compliance with [the law]." However, the Department must first consider: the operational and safety characteristics of such vehicles and of the roadways, provided that the department may rescind any roadway designation if it is determined by the department that the public safety has been diminished or that operational problems have been increased by the actual operation of such vehicles. The delegation of authority to the Department of Transportation is not unconstitutional. See Ward v. State, 248 Ga. 60, 62 ( 281 SE2d 503) (1981). 10. In light of these dispositions, other enumerated constitutional challenges need not be addressed. kind occupies as long as the most important act of legislation, and takes place of everything else." Letter to Edward Carrington, August 4, 1787. | 
