1  Here it is unclear what service provision applied or was attempted. The husband alleged in his complaint the wife was a resident of Georgia but could be served at an address in South Carolina. If true, the only valid service on the wife would have been personal service under OCGA 9-11-4 (e) (2). The OCGA 9-11-4 (d) (7) provision for service on a person then "residing therein," at the defendant's dwelling, cannot apply where the defendant is only sojourning, rather than residing. However, it appears the wife was a resident of South Carolina at the time the complaint was filed. In that case, she was subject to jurisdiction under the domestic relations long arm statute, OCGA 9-10-91 (5), compare Smith v. Smith, 254 Ga. 450 (330 SE2d 706) (1985) with Popple v. Popple, 257 Ga. 98 (355 SE2d 657) (1987), the appropriate service provision for which is contained in OCGA 9-10-94 rather than OCGA 9-11-4 (d) (7). That section provides for service on a non-resident in the same manner as service is made within the state where the defendant resides. Coincidentally, the South Carolina statute, SCRCP 4 (d) (1) is identical to OCGA 9-11-4 (d) (7). The husband cites no authority and we find none to support a construction of the South Carolina statute contrary to its express terms. Indeed, South Carolina law appears to require strict compliance with its service statutes. See Seubert v. Buchanan, 250 S.C. 140 (156 SE2d 632) (1967). Here, the wife was not properly served as either a resident of Georgia, sojourning in South Carolina, under OCGA 9-11-4 (e) (2), or as a resident of South Carolina subject to jurisdiction under the long arm statute, OCGA 9-10-94. Nevertheless, this case is presented to us for a construction of OCGA 9-11-4 (d) (7), and for a determination of the validity of the "substantial compliance" rule of Brim v. Pruitt, 178 Ga. App. 321, 325 (342 SE2d 690) (1986) and Sanders v. Johnson, 181 Ga. App. 39 (351 SE2d 216) (1986).

2  Gant v. Gant, 254 Ga. 239 (327 SE2d 723) (1955) cited by the majority in Brim v. Pruitt, supra, for the proposition that where actual notice of suit is received by the defendant the rules regarding service should be liberally construed to effectuate service, involved a minor defect in the wording on the summons. we decline to extend the holding in that case to allow the provisions regarding the method of service to be ignored altogether.