Johnny Ware and his brother, Parnell Ware, appeal their convictions for the murder of Paul Alexander. 1 We affirm. The evidence, when viewed most favorably to the prosecution, shows that Johnny Ware made an unsuccessful attempt to sell cocaine to the victim. The victim ran away with the cocaine, but Johnny Ware caught the victim and beat him. They were joined by Parnell Ware, who had been summoned by Johnny Ware. Parnell Ware shot the victim twice in the abdomen, with a pistol. The appellants recovered the cocaine, and ran from the scene of the shooting. The victim was later taken to a hospital, where he died from his gunshot wounds. S89A0223. Johnny Ware 1. Johnny Ware was convicted of both malice murder and felony murder. 2 Appellant contends that the evidence of the offenses was insufficient to meet the standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979), and that the trial court therefore erred by not granting a directed verdict on both offenses. We disagree, as we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found appellant guilty of malice murder and felony murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The trial court ruled correctly in denying a directed verdict. Jackson v. State, 258 Ga. 810 (1) (375 SE2d 454) (1989). 2. Appellant's enumeration that the court erred in allowing the jury to consider the evidence of malice murder and felony murder during the same trial is without merit. S89A0225. Parnell Ware 3. Parnell Ware was convicted of malice murder. He asserts that the evidence of the crime was insufficient to meet the test of Jackson v. Virginia, supra, 443 U. S., and that the trial court erred by failing to grant a directed verdict on the charge. However, we conclude that the evidence would authorize a rational trier of fact to find appellant guilty of malice murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. There was no error in denying a directed verdict. Jackson v. State, supra, 258 Ga. 4. Parnell Ware was acquitted of felony murder. Nevertheless, he contends that the evidence of this charge was insufficient to meet the Jackson v. Virginia standard, and that the trial court erred by not granting a directed verdict concerning the charge. This enumeration has no merit, because the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to convict appellant of felony murder was mooted when the jury acquitted him on that charge. 5. Appellant's argument that it was error to allow the jury to consider the evidence of both felony murder and malice murder is without merit. William G. Hamrick, Jr., District Attorney, Peter J. Skandalakis, Agnes T. McCabe, Assistant District Attorneys, Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Richard C. Litwin, for appellee. | 
