1. Cecil has moved this court to dismiss the appeal contending this is an appeal pertaining to a divorce matter which involves a discretionary appeal and under OCGA 5-6-35 (Code Ann. 6-701.1) requires an application for such an appeal addressed to this court. We conclude, however, that this appeal deals with the dismissal of a garnishment proceeding and the divorce is only incidental thereto. Therefore, the motion to dismiss the appeal is denied.

2. This case is controlled by the provisions of 42 USC 662 (c) and Nash v. Nash, 244 Ga. 749 (262 SE2d 64) recognizing and reaffirming Duncan v. Duncan, 239 Ga. 789, 790 (238 SE2d 902). 42 USC 662 (c) in pertinent part provides: "Such term [alimony] does not include any payment or transfer of property . . . to his . . . former spouse in compliance with . . . division of property between . . . former spouses." The Duncan case, supra, at p. 791 held: ". . . that provisions in a decree specifying periodic payments to be made until a sum certain has been paid [i. e., the full amount of each indebtedness ascertainable from the face of each instrument of indebtedness] is a property settlement. . . ."

Our view of the context of the divorce decree of 1975 leaves no doubt that the divorce court intended to and did effect a property settlement. Such a settlement even though required in periodic installments amounted to a property settlement and may not be the subject of a garnishment of pay and entitlements of an employee of the United States Government. We find no error by the trial court in dismissing the affidavit of garnishment.