Williams and a co-defendant, Adams, were convicted of burglary and appeal following the denial of their motions for a new trial.

"[E]vidence of the confession of a co-defendant implicating a defendant cannot be admitted against that defendant at a joint trial where the co-defendant does not take the stand and is not available for cross-examination. Reddish v. State, 238 Ga. 136, 138 (231 SE2d 737) (1977); Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S. 123 (88 SC 1620, 20 LE2d 476) (1968). However, where the testimony presented in the co-defendant's confession is supported by the complaining defendant's own confession, there is no violation of appellant's right of confrontation. Gamarra v. State, 142 Ga. App. 196, 197 (2) (235 SE2d 652) (1977); Mahone v. State, 237 Ga. 120, 121 (3) (227 SE2d 16) (1976)." Butler v. State, 156 Ga. App. 89, 90 (274 SE2d 104) (1980). The mere fact that a Bruton violation exists does not require reversal of a criminal conviction unless there is a reasonable possibility that the improperly admitted evidence contributed to the conviction. Schneble v. Florida, 405 U. S. 427 (92 SC 1056, 31 LE2d 340) (1970). Here, one of the victims testified that she arrived at her home to find two black men inside. She ran around to the back of the house and saw them escaping from her back door, got a good look at their faces, and positively identified them at trial. She further testified as to the condition of the inside of her house and as to the items missing. Her husband testified that he received the stolen items from the police and there was testimony by a police officer that Williams took the police to a residence where the stolen property was recovered. This enumeration is without merit.

2. Williams also asserts the general grounds. Applying the rule in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979), we find that a rational trier of fact could have found the defendants guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Rachel v. State, 247 Ga. 130 (274 SE2d 475) (1981).