He was indicted for malice murder, convicted, and sentenced to life imprisonment. 1 His defense was insanity.

1. The evidence in this case meets the requirements of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).

2. Before Rowland was indicted, his counsel and the district attorney, with Rowland's concurrence, agreed that the district attorney would seek an indictment for voluntary manslaughter, Rowland would plead guilty, and the district attorney would recommend the maximum sentence of twenty years' imprisonment. Such an indictment was returned. The district attorney later received information from which he concluded that the agreed-upon disposition would be inappropriate, and that a malice murder indictment should be sought. The grand jury then returned such an indictment, on which Rowland was tried. Rowland moved the trial court to enforce the agreement that is, allow him to plead guilty to the manslaughter indictment. The trial court's denial of the motion is cited as error. This contention is governed by State v. Hanson, 249 Ga. 739, 745 (295 SE2d 297) (1982). Under the evidence of the case, there was no error.

3. Rowland's request that the trial court charge the elements of voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included of malice murder properly was denied. Denson v. State, 253 Ga. 93, 95 (316 SE2d 469) (1984).

Word & Flinn, Gerald P. Word, T. Michael Flinn, for appellant.