Initially, compensation was awarded by the administrative law judge; the full board on appeal denied compensation; then the superior court reversed the board's order of denial. On the first appeal, this court affirmed the superior court's reversal of the full board's award, and directed that the case be recommitted to the board for further consideration pursuant to our rulings that there had been sufficient notice of the injury and that the board's findings of fact, based on its misconstruction of the testimony of expert witness, Dr. Burr, were completely erroneous. The board's conclusion of law was, "While the board recognizes there is some evidence stating otherwise, the board is of the opinion that the overwhelming weight of all the evidence as disclosed by the claimant himself, his father, the supervisor, and the doctors, shows a condition which was in existence at the age of 13 that had deteriorated and manifested itself while he was taking a water break. The condition was neither caused nor aggravated by activity at work." The employer and its workmen's compensation insurance carrier appeal from the order of the superior court reversing the board's award and granting compensation. Held: The full board's revised findings of fact corrected the deficiencies in its previous findings, as pointed out by this court on the prior appeal, i.e., the matter of notice and the misconstruction of Dr. Burr's testimony. It seems apparent that the superior court, as had the administrative law judge, accepted as a fact that the alleged July 2, 1974, injury had in fact occurred, and concluded that it had aggravated the preexisting congenital defect, based upon Dr. Burr's testimony that it could have, which answer was predicated on the hypothetical assumption that there was such an injury capable of producing this result. It seems equally apparent that the full board considered the possibility of such aggravation, but concluded that the alleged injury either never occurred, or, if so, that it was insufficient to produce the result. Based upon the nine controlling principles applicable to this situation, which are set forth in Howard Sheppard, Inc. v. McGowan, 137 Ga. App. 408, 410 ( 224 SE2d 65) (1976), and incorporated, although not quoted, in this opinion, we hold that the findings of fact of the full board, being supported by some evidence, were conclusive and binding upon the court; that the judge of the superior court had no authority to set aside the award based on those findings of fact, merely because he disagreed with the conclusions reached therein; that neither the superior court nor this court has any authority to substitute itself as a fact finding body in lieu of the board; and that, after the board had determined the weight and credit to be given testimony of witnesses and conflicts in evidence and entered its award, the award -- supported by evidence construed in a light most favorable to the party prevailing before the board and by every presumption in favor of its validity -- should have been affirmed by the superior court. Roy D. Moultrie, for appellee. | 
