2. An instruction on the theory of accident is not applicable where nothing indicates that the injury was due to unavoidable accident, and the facts proved present a question of whether the plaintiff's negligence or the defendant's, or some combination of the two, was the proximate cause. Atlantic C. L. R. Co. v. Jones, 132 Ga. 189
, 196 (63 SE 834
). Although the definition of accident in Code 102-103 ("that [which] takes place without one's foresight or expectation . . . or begins to exist without design") is somewhat ambiguous, in that it may also be said of lack of ordinary care that it does not exist by reason of foresight or design, yet the distinction has often been clearly stated in the cases as something which would not have been precluded by the exercise of ordinary care on the part of either plaintiff or defendant. It may be an "act of God" (Central Ga. Elec. Membership Corp. v. Heath, 60 Ga. App. 649 (4 SE2d 700)
), or a pure casualty which exists without fault or carelessness on the part of either party. Massey v. Ga. Power Co., 85 Ga. App. 593 (69 SE2d 824)
. The event may be an accident as to the parties where, as in Cobb v. Big Apple Supermarket of Columbus, 106 Ga. App. 790 (128 SE2d 536)
any negligence involved was attributable either to one not party to the suit or to one too young to be legally chargeable therewith. In other cases, where the question truly lies between the alleged culpability of one party and the alleged failure to avoid on the part of the other, inevitable accident is not involved. Davenport v. Little, 132 Ga. App. 391 (208 SE2d 179)
; Gurin v. Harris, 129 Ga. App. 561 (200 SE2d 368)
and cit. The court did not err in refusing a requested instruction on inevitable accident.