1. Since the appellant is a purely public charity and meets the requirements of Code Ann. 92-201, the property is tax exempt.

2. Where there is no certificate by the trial judge, the refusal to grant a motion for summary judgment is not subject to review by direct appeal or otherwise.

The appellant filed a petition in the Fulton Superior Court seeking to have its property declared tax exempt as a purely public charity. Both the appellees and the appellant filed motions for summary judgment. The facts revealed that: the appellant operates a home for elderly persons of the Jewish faith; the appellant acquired the home by charitable gift; the eligibility age is 65 years; however the average age of the residents as of early 1969 was 82.9 years; because of this fact the great majority of the residents continually require very considerable medical attention and nursing care; as a result of the great age and debility of the residents, it is necessary for appellant to devote a substantial portion of its resources to medical and nursing care; out of the total operating budget of the home, 36% is attributable to medical and nursing expenses, and 55% of the staff of the home are in the nursing department; medical care provided the residents is very substantial; there is a medical director on the staff of the home, and a nursing staff, and some 69 doctors and dentists in private practice contribute free services to residents of the home from time to time; hospital type services and facilities provided by the home include every type of hospital care except major surgery; the practice followed by appellant throughout the existence of the home has been to have each applicant for admission supply certain financial data; this information is evaluated and, on the basis of it a monthly charge is made; there is no initial or entrance fee; the charge is based upon ability to pay and ranges from zero up to a maximum charge of $450; the residents make payments based upon ability to pay, but no applicant has ever been refused admission because of inability to pay; there are always residents who pay nothing or only nominal amounts; in 1967, eleven residents paid nothing; eight paid less than $50 per month and twelve paid between $50 and $100 per month; twenty-five paid the maximum; all residents, without regard to the amounts they pay, receive the full benefit of all available services; the rooms are alike and are assigned without reference to payment and such things as medical care are provided on the basis of need; the deficit has each year been made up by charitable contributions from individuals who approve the work of appellant, from the Jewish Welfare Fund, and from other organizations.

In regard to admission requirements the evidence showed that: "a social study" is made on each applicant; each applicant must have a physical examination; each applicant must have been a resident of Georgia for at least one year; any person who misrepresents his financial condition may be discharged; the agreement of admissions provides for repayment if the patient is found to have assets or leaves an estate.

The trial court granted the appellees' motion for summary judgment and denied that of the appellant. The appellant appealed and the case is here for review.

1. For the appellant to be tax exempt it must be purely charitable and public. Code Ann. 92-201 (Ga. L. 1943, p. 348; 1946, p. 12; 1947, p. 1183; 1955, pp. 262, 263; 1965, pp. 182, 183). See Code Ann. 2-5404 (Ga. Const., Art. VII, Sec. I, Par. IV. "A familiar meaning of the word 'charity' is almsgiving, but as used in the law it may include 'substantially any scheme or effort to better the condition of society or any considerable part of it.' Wilson v. Independence First National Bank, 164 Iowa 402, 412 (145 NW 948, AC 1916D, 481). 'Charity, as used in tax exemption statutes, is not restricted to the relief of the sick or indigent, but extends to other forms of philanthropy or public beneficence, such as practical enterprises for the good of humanity, operated at moderate cost to the beneficiaries, or enterprises operated for the general improvement and happiness of mankind.' 61 CJ 453, 505." Tharpe v. Central Ga. Council, B. S. A., 185 Ga. 810, 813 (196 SE 762, 116 ALR 373).

The appellees contend that the home is not public because the applicants must meet certain requirements before they may be admitted. It is true that the requirements for admission limited the class of people who might enjoy the benefits of the home; however, to qualify as public it is not necessary that the home be open to the entire public. It is sufficient that it be open to the classes for whose relief it was intended. Trustees of the Academy of Richmond County v. Bohler, 80 Ga. 159 (7 SE 633); Tharpe v. Central Ga. Council, 185 Ga. 810, supra. The requirements for admission in the case sub judice were not such as prevented the home from qualifying as public.

Neither would the fact that the residents paid rent according to their ability destroy the charitable nature of the institution. Brewer v. American Missionary Assn., 124 Ga. 490 (52 SE 804); Williamson v. Housing Authority of Augusta, 186 Ga. 673 (199 SE 43); Elder v. Henrietta Egleston Hospital, 205 Ga. 489, 492 (53 SE2d 751). In the present case it was shown that in 1967, which was stated to be typical of the monthly amounts paid by the residents, more than 50% of the residents paid less than maximum and of the 61 residents 11 paid nothing. The record further reveals that the payments made by the residents have been insufficient to cover the cost of the direct operating expenses of the home and the deficit was made up by contributions.

The purpose of the home is to care for the aged and provide for their physical and mental welfare. As is stated in Bozeman Deaconess Foundation v. Ford, 151 Mont. 143, 148 (439 P2d 915): "The concept of charity is not confined to the relief of the needy and destitute, for aged people require care and attention apart from financial assistance, and the supply of this care and attention is as much a charitable and benevolent purpose as the relief of their financial wants.'

The appellant is a purely public charity and as such the property is tax exempt; therefore the granting of the appellees' motion for summary judgment was error. Peachtree on Peachtree Inn, Inc. v. Camp, 120 Ga. App. 403 (170 SE2d 709).

review by appeal; but an order denying summary judgment is not subject to review by direct appeal or otherwise, unless within 10 days of the order of denial the trial judge certifies that the order denying summary judgment as to any issue or as to any party should be subject to review, in which case such order shall be subject to review by direct appeal."

EVANS, Judge, concurring specially.