The court erred, under the facts of this case, in failing to charge the jury without a request that where the name of a corporation has been legally changed it is suable in the new corporate name, although the alleged cause of action may have arisen before the change of its name. For that reason a new trial should have been granted.

This is an appeal from the overruling of a plaintiff's amended motion for a new trial in an action on an open account wherein a verdict was returned in favor of the defendant appellee. The general grounds of the motion for a new trial were waived and a reversal of the judgment attacked is sought solely on one special ground, to wit, that the trial court failed to charge the jury as to the principle of law relating to the liability of a corporation, under its new name, for debts incurred by it prior to the change of its name, the defendant having urged as one of its main defenses on the trial that the wrong corporation had been sued. This case was tried before a jury prior to the Appellate Practice Act of 1965.

H & L Construction Company, Inc. was chartered on April 15, 1957. By amendment the name of the corporation was changed to Homer Leggett Construction Company, Inc., before which time Homer Leggett acquired all of the stock of the corporation. Where the name of a corporation has been legally changed it is suable in the new corporate name, although the alleged cause of action may have arisen before the change. Porter v. State Grand Lodge No. 1, 146 Ga. 13 (1) (90 SE 281). The appellee contended on the trial that he intended to reorganize the original corporation but the evidence shows that this was not done. The changes made in the amendment authorized by the resolution of the sole stockholder were (1) the change of name as aforesaid, (2) the change of the principal office of the corporation from Dallas, Georgia, to the City of Hiram, Georgia, both of which were located in Paulding County. Under the circumstances above it was obviously error for the trial court to fail to give in charge the law cited above without request. It was also harmful to the appellant. There is no merit in the contention of the appellee that the special ground amounted to a claim that the jury found "contrary to specific charges of the court" and consequently was equivalent to claiming that the verdict was contrary to the evidence and that therefore the general grounds of the motion were the only complaints and that since they were waived the judgment should be affirmed.

The court erred in overruling the motion for a new trial on the special ground.

Judgment reversed. Eberhardt and Whitman, JJ., concur.