Thurston Matthews brought suit against Willie Lee Wilson, Brady R. Little, Waymon Long, and Waymon Long Trucking Company seeking to recover for personal injuries sustained in a three-car collision. The automobiles were being operated by Matthews, Little and Wilson. Wilson filed a counterclaim, alleging that Matthews and Little negligently caused their automobiles to collide with each other and with his. Matthews moved for a summary judgment on the counterclaim which was denied; and, upon certificate of the trial court, the matter is here for review. The general situation disclosed by the record is that as Matthews' vehicle approached the crest of a hill going westward on Georgia Highway No. 53 toward Fairmount, either Wilson or Little (there is an issue of fact as to whether the vehicle passing Matthews was driven by Wilson or Little), who was following Matthews, attempted to pass him to the left. At the same time. the other vehicle (operated either by Wilson or Little) crested the same hill proceeding in the opposite, or eastwardly, direction, whereupon the Wilson and Little vehicles collided involving the Matthews vehicle. "Both vehicles appeared to be moving rather rapidly, but I could not say with any degree of certainty as to just how fast either was traveling." "Please state in narrative form just exactly how you remember the wreck happening." "I was traveling along Georgia Highway Number 53 late in the afternoon at a time when it was nearly dark, probably around 6:30 p.m. or 6:45 p.m. As best I recall, the road was straight and I was meeting a car coming from the opposite direction [Matthews' vehicle]. Just as that car and my car were very close to passing, suddenly, a pair of headlights swung out from behind the car which I was meeting and into my lane of traffic. I have no further recollection of what happened." Subsequent to Wilson's filing of the above answers to the interrogatories, Matthews filed a supplemental interrogatory requesting the specifications of negligence Wilson was relying upon in his counterclaim against him. Wilson answered: "A. Failure to control his vehicle. B. Driving too fast for conditions. C. Failure to yield to his right after he had notice of an impending emergency." Wilson's deposition was taken, and he stated repeatedly that he could recall nothing as to how the collision occurred. Little, in his deposition, stated that he was going east and met Matthews and Little traveling west. 1 He testified that Matthews was properly in his west bound lane, did nothing to cause the collision and could have done nothing to avoid it. Under this evidence Matthews claims that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact as to the counterclaim filed against him by Wilson. Matthews' motion for summary judgment on the counterclaim should have been granted. The only matter in the record indicating any negligence on his part is Wilson's statement in the interrogatories as to the specifications of negligence he relied upon. These, of course, are conclusions and not statements of facts. "In considering depositions and affidavits in support of or in opposition to motions for summary judgments the facts contained therein, and not the conclusions stated, determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists." Varnadoe v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 112 Ga. App. 366 (1) (145 SE2d 104). As to affidavits, CPA 56 (e) (Code Ann. 81A-156 (e)) specifically provides that they shall "set forth such facts as would be admissible in the evidence." The same rule applies to depositions, interrogatories, and other evidence submitted on motion for summary judgment under the principle that admissibility of evidence on motion for summary judgment is governed by the rules relating to form and admissibility of evidence generally, so that evidence inadmissible on a hearing of the case would be inadmissible on motion for summary judgment. Roucher v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 235 F2d 423 (CA 5); 608 Hamilton St. Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 244 FSupp. 193 (E.D. Pa.); Standard Rolling Mills v. Nat. Mineral Co., 2 FRD 236 (E.D. N.Y.); Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F2d 675, 677, note 2 (CA 1); Chan Wing Cheung v. Hamilton, 298 F2d 459 (CA 1); Youngblood v. Board of Public Instruction, 230 FSupp. 74 (N.D. Fla.); Taylor v. Rederi A/S Volo, 249 FSupp. 326 (E.D. Pa.), reversed on other grounds 374 F2d 545. Since the specifications would be objectionable as evidence of negligence at the trial and, even if admitted into evidence, would be conclusions without probative value (see, e.g., Patterson v. Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co., 221 Ga. 878, 882 ( 148 SE2d 320)), they cannot be considered as evidence of negligence on motion for summary judgment. | 
