Where the jury returned a verdict in favor of one of the parties to a case, and the verdict was demanded by the evidence, including evidence proffered by the losing party but excluded by the court, enumerations of error concerning the charge of the court and the exclusion of such evidence do not require reversal.

Plaintiff filed suit for the wrongful death of her husband who was allegedly killed because of the negligence of the defendant electrical company and of its employee, Cash, who was named as a party defendant but was never served. A complete statement of the petition may be found at the first appearance of this case (110 Ga. App. 790 (140 SE2d 99)), where it was held, inter alia, that the petition sufficiently alleged that the electrical work to be performed in decedent's home was the undertaking of the company and not of Cash individually.

Upon trial before a jury the evidence disclosed in general that the company had followed a practice of securing permits, and otherwise dealing with governmental agencies, for electrical work performed by certain of its employees outside their regular working hours with the company. The employees furnished the labor and materials and received payment therefor directly from the persons desiring the work, but they were unable to secure permits, etc., for the work because they were not licensed electricians. The company, being duly licensed, co-operated by securing the necessary approval of the governmental agencies although it received no compensation for doing so.

Under this arrangement Cash, with the knowledge and approval of the company's president, had performed several jobs on his own time for decedent, who was a general building contractor with whom the company had previously dealt. This course of dealing between decedent and Cash resulted in an oral agreement similar to the others, whereby Cash was to perform electrical work at decedent's personal residence, the company to secure the necessary permits, etc., although it was disputed as to whether or not the company's president had knowledge of this particular agreement. At any rate Cash undertook to rewire decedent's home, which was being expanded, and it was during the course of the work that decedent met with his death, apparently as a result of electrocution occurring when decedent drilled through a floor joist in the crawl space under the house and struck an electric wire on the opposite side of the joist. The wire thus struck with the drill was not one which Cash had installed but was part of the original house wiring.

The crucial allegations of the petition were that during Cash's performance of the electrical work it became necessary for him to drill two holes in a floor joist in the basement of decedent's residence; that because of an alleged physical disability, Cash informed decedent that he was unable to hold and support the electric drill; that Cash enlisted decedent to operate the drill and bore the holes; and that Cash instructed decedent as to the location of the holes to be drilled and departed the basement area. Specifications of negligence against Cash were that he allowed a person untrained in the operation of electric drills to operate one in the vicinity of hidden electric wires which Cash knew or should have known were present; that he failed to warn decedent of the danger involved in the operation of a drill in the vicinity of charged wires; that he failed to ground the drill so as to prevent an electric shock to the operator in the event live electric wires were contacted by the drill; that he failed to investigate the possibility of live electric wires being located behind the floor joist through which holes were to be drilled; that he failed to supervise the operation of the drill by decedent; and that he failed to provide decedent with insulated gloves to prevent the possibility of his suffering an electric shock in the event the drill contacted live electric wires. The company itself was alleged to be negligent in failing to provide supervision, direction and guidance to Cash in the exercise of the work, and to be vicariously liable for Cash's negligence by virtue of the fact that Cash was within the scope of his employment with the company, that the company was estopped to deny the agency of Cash, and that the company ratified the acts of Cash as being acts of an agent and employee within the scope of his employment.

From verdict and judgment in favor of defendant company, plaintiff appeals.

1. (a) Error is enumerated upon failure of the trial court to charge on estoppel to deny agency and on ratification "by a principal of an apparent agent's tort" (sic), and upon the exclusion of certain testimony as to the cause of death. Assuming that such matters are error, or that the charges contended for had been given and the proffered evidence admitted, a verdict in favor of defendant company on the issue of liability was nevertheless demanded by the evidence, and hence a reversal is not required. Cf. Burgamy v. Morris, 219 Ga. 776 (135 SE2d 868).

(b) As to the allegation of negligence of the company in failing to provide supervision, direction and guidance to Cash, there was no evidence to raise such a duty. The president of the company testified that the company's only interest in the matter was to see that the finished job met the standards required by the electrical code and was acceptable to the inspection department of the governmental agency. Day-by-day supervision was not contemplated by anyone involved. Plaintiff herself testified: "Q. Did you ever complain to Mr. Fink (president of the company) or to anybody else that he wasn't there to supervise the work? A. No, because he had to come and inspect it, I thought he would come and inspect it later. It was not at a point he could have until Roy (Cash) had finished what he came to do that day. Q. The thing is, is this true, Mrs. Higgins, you didn't expect him to be there supervising the job, did you? A. Not at that point, later yes, to come and see what was going on. He was furnishing the permit, he had a big part in it. Q. Up to the time that your husband died you did not expect him to come? A. That's right, the work wasn't ready yet. Q. May I finish my question please, ma'am. Up to the time your husband died you did not expect Mr. Fink to supervise the job in any way, did you? A. That's right."

And you didn't tell him where to drill any holes? A. I did not. Q. But you didn't ask him to do any drilling? A. No. I didn't. Q. And you don't know why he went down and started drilling? A. No, I don't. That's the truth . . . Did you at any time point out to Mr. Higgins that that wire was there? A. No. My recollection, no. I didn't figure that it was no use in pointing it out to him. Q. Did you ever give Mr. Higgins any instructions as to how to use this drill? A. No, I didn't . . . Q. You never gave Mr. Higgins any instructions as to how to operate this drill? A. No. Q. Did you ever ask him to watch you operate it? A. No. Q. Did you ever ask him to operate it? A. Not that I recall, no. A. But you are not certain that you didn't ask him to operate it, are you? A. I wouldn't be afraid to bet on it that I told him not to. Q. But you are not certain that you didn't ask him to operate it? A. Well, it's been so long I can't recall. Q. And you may have asked him to operate it? A. No, I don't I'd say I wouldn't ask him to operate it. Q. All right. You are certain that you did not ask him to operate it? A. Yes. Q. And you never observed him operate it at any time? A. To my knowledge, no."

Under this evidence we must conclude that a finding was demanded that Cash had not enlisted decedent to bore holes with the drill and that Cash had no knowledge or reason to anticipate that decedent would attempt to do so. Hence the enumerations of error, even if meritorious, do not require reversal under the circumstances here. Cf. Burgamy v. Morris, 219 Ga. 776, supra.

Even if it be said that there was some circumstantial evidence indicating that the decedent may have been working under Cash's direction, the unimpeached, uncontradicted, positive testimony of Cash demanded a contrary finding. Frazier v. Ga. R. &c. Co., 108 Ga. 807 (33 SE 996); Taggart v. Savannah Gas Co., 179 Ga. 181 (1) (175 SE 491); Myers v. Phillips, 197 Ga. 536 (4) (29 SE2d 700); Emory University v. Bliss, 35 Ga. App. 752 (134 SE 637); Western &c. R. v. Gentle, 58 Ga. App. 282, 297 (198 SE 257); Slaton v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 62 Ga. App. 42 (7 SE2d 769); Allgood v. Dalton Brick &c. Corp., 81 Ga. App. 189 (4) (58 SE2d 522); Spruell v. Ga. Automatic &c. Co., 84 Ga. App. 657, 664 (67 SE2d 178); Johnson v. Webb-Crawford Co., 89 Ga. App. 524 (80 SE2d 63).

Judgment affirmed. Felton, C. J., and Whitman, J., concur.