The unsworn answer to the action on the unconditional promissory note was merely a general denial of the indebtedness sued upon, raising no issuable defense; therefore, the court did not err in dismissing the answer and rendering a default judgment in favor of the plaintiff.

Georgia Bank & Trust Company brought an action on November 4, 1966, on a promissory note executed by defendant, Charles Belt, dated April 6, 1966, and payable in 6 monthly installments, terminating on October 15, 1966. On November 21, 1966, the defendant filed an unsworn answer in which he admitted jurisdiction; denied Paragraph 2 of the petition, as pleaded, which alleged the amount of the principal of his indebtedness on the note sued on and attached as an exhibit; answered the allegations of Paragraph 3 as to the giving of notice for the collection of attorney's fees as provided in the note and Code Ann. 20-506 by admitting that plaintiff's counsel had given a letter "pertaining to some non-existent Code section which does not exist at law in the State of Georgia"; and denied the allegations of Paragraph 4, that the amount sued for is due and unpaid and that the defendant refuses to pay the same or any part thereof. On January 9, 1967, the court sustained the plaintiff's motion to dismiss the defendant's answer and entered a default judgment for the plaintiff, from which judgment defendant appeals.

Since the action was instituted subsequently to the maturity date of the note, the note was not, at that time, a conditional contract, even if it contained stipulations providing for acceleration of maturity, at the holder's option and optional attorney's fees upon certain other conditions, as is contended by appellant. Cf. Hartsfield Co. No. 3 v. Williams, 114 Ga. App. 547, 548 (2) (151 SE2d 908) and cit.

The defendant's mere unsworn denial of the allegations of Paragraph 2 as pleaded is evasive, constitutes neither a denial of the paragraph nor an issuable defense to the suit upon the promissory note, and is not amendable. Chastain v. Consolidated Credit Corp., 113 Ga. App. 225, 228 (2, 3) (147 SE2d 807) and cit.; Keith v. Streicher Mfg. Co., 108 Ga. App. 183 (2) (132 SE2d 559) and cit.; Watson v. Davis, 97 Ga. App. 378, 380 (5) (103 SE2d 182); Peed v. Rowe, 30 Ga. App. 626 (118 SE 475). The answer with regard to notice of attorney's fee does not deny the receipt of the notice, but merely claims that Code Ann. 20-506 is a "non-existent" section--an allegation the error of which is readily apparent from reference to that annotated Code section (Ga. L. 1957, p. 264). Neither does the answer raise the issue of mutual departure from the original terms of the contract, which is argued for the first time here. The installment loan ledger which purportedly evidences this novation, although appearing in the record, is neither referred to in the petition nor marked as an exhibit.

No issuable defense having been filed under oath or affirmation, the court did not err in striking the defendant's answer and rendering judgment without the verdict of a jury for the plaintiff in this civil case founded on the unconditional contract. See Constitution of Georgia, Art. VI, Sec. IV, Par. VII (Code Ann. 2-3907); Code 24-3355 (Superior Court Rule 55); Code Ann. 110-401 (Ga. L. 1962, pp. 687, 688), superseding repealed 110-406 (Ga. L. 1946, pp. 761, 777; Ga. L. 1953, Nov. Sess., pp. 440, 451); and cases cited hereinabove.