1. (a) When an opinion is sought from a witness as to the value of a thing, it is necessary that it be shown that the witness has some knowledge, experience or familiarity with the value of the thing or of similar things. This foundation is essential in order to show the bases or the reasons for the witness' opinion as to the value of the thing.
(b) An owner of property may not testify as to his opinion of the value of the property in a single or gross amount without "giving his reasons therefor" or else showing that he has had an opportunity for forming a correct opinion."
(c) Division 2 of the case of Warren v. State, 76 Ga. App. 243 (45 SE2d 726) is expressly overruled.
2. (a) An opinion as to value based solely on cost price is inadmissible in evidence as it has no probative value.
(b) The cost price of an item, if coupled properly with other evidence such as a showing of the condition of the item both at the time of purchase and at the time its value is in issue, may be admitted as an element upon which an opinion may be formed as to the item's value.
3. (a) The question of the value of property is peculiarly one for the jury. Jurors are not required to accept as correct opinion evidence of value even where there is no other evidence of facts and data upon which the jury might base an independent conclusion.
(b) It is error for a trial judge to direct a verdict where the only evidence as to the value of property is opinion testimony even though the opinion testimony is uncontradicted by any other evidence in the case.
(c) A portion of the case of Elder v. Woodruff Hardware &c. Co., 16 Ga. App. 255 (85 SE 268) is expressly disapproved.
4. Under the provisions of Code 110-401, the trial court did not err in granting plaintiff's motion to strike defendant's answer.
Plaintiff sued in trover to recover the value of malt beverages and wine as follows: "5 cases of Schlitz; 1 case of Colt 45; 3 cases of Miller's High Life; 2 cases of Falstaff; 3 cases of Country Club; 2 cases of Budweiser, 3 cases of wine assorted white dark port, gypsy rose scuppernong, and red hurricane peach."
The plaintiff was the only witness testifying.
On direct examination the sole testimony as to the value of the items consisted of the following: "Q. Are you familiar with the list of beer as contained in paragraph one on your petition there? Check this to refresh you memory. (Handing petition to witness.) A. Yes, Sir. Q. What in your opinion is the value of that beer? A. There was Two Hundred ($200) Dollars or better."
On cross examination the testimony was, "Q. Mr. Wiley, what's 5 cases of Carlings Black Label, worth? A. I don't recall. Q. Mr. Wiley, what's the value of 5 cases of Carlings Black Label? A. Regular or King? Q. I don't know. You allege 5 cases of Carlings Black Label in your petition. You tell me the value of that Carlings Black Label. A. Twenty Nine Dollars and Fifty ($29.50) Cents. Q. Well, was that king size? A. Yes, sir. Q. What's the value of that many cases of Black Label regular size? A. I wouldn't have any idea. Q. Don't have any idea? You don't fool with regular? Q. Is that retail or wholesale value you're talking about? Q. Did you pay that much for it? A. Yes, sir. Q. Where did you buy it? Q. Okay. Three cases of Pabst Blue Ribbon? A. Eighteen ($18) Dollars. Q. You allege in here that you had some scuppernong wine. Is that true? A. (no reply). Q. Did you have some Scuppernong wine? A. I had around four different kinds. Q. Four different kinds of wine? A. Yes, sir. Q. Did you have some scuppernong wine? A. Had four different kinds. Q. You have some dark port wine? A. Yes, sir. Q. How much of that did you have? A. Don't know. Q. Don't know? Have some scuppernong wine? A. I'm not positive if I had any scuppernong wine or not. Q. You got it in your petition here as part of that $200 Dollar value, haven't you? A. Yes, sir, I had some. Q. How much did you have of that? A. I don't know exactly how much. Q. You don't know? That's part of the value of this $200 Dollars that you placed on it? A. Yes, sir. Q. And you don't know how much you had? A. I don't know, no sir. Q. All right. Did you have some Red Hurricane Peach? A. Yes, sir. Q. How much of that did you have? A. I declare I don't know. Q. Don't know? Have some white and dark port, too? A. Yes, sir. Q. How much of that did you have? A. I don't know."
At the conclusion of the testimony the trial judge directed a verdict for the plaintiff in the amount of $200.
The defendant excepts to the judgment of the trial court overruling his motion for new trial on the general and three special grounds.
This case affords the court an opportunity to bring into a somewhat better focus a phase of the law which has become confusing and hazy through too many ill-considered opinions originating in the appellate courts. The issue concerns the always elusive question of value which, it is safe to say, is present in some manner in a majority of the civil cases litigated.
1. It is to be observed from the factual summation that the plaintiff, as owner of the goods, testified without any explanation that in his opinion the value of the beer "was $200.00 or better." Viewing the quoted testimony in its most favorable light and without considering plaintiff's other testimony on cross examination which gravely detracts from its efficacy, that testimony standing alone would not authorize a verdict in plaintiff's favor for that or any other sum.
Thus when an opinion is sought from a witness as to the value of a thing, it is necessary that it be shown that the witness had some knowledge, experience or familiarity with the value of the thing or of similar things. This foundation is essential in order to show the bases or the reasons for the witness' opinion as to the value of the thing. In absence of that showing, the testimony is inadmissible and is utterly insignificant since it represents nothing more than an unsupported conclusion or guess of the witness. 1
For that reason, even though testimony of that type be admitted without objection and remain in the record, it cannot support a verdict as it has no probative value. "One need not be an expert or dealer in the article, but may testify as to valued, if he has an opportunity for forming a correct opinion." Code 38-1709. "Where the question under examination . . . shall be one of opinion, any witness may swear to his opinion or belief, giving his reasons therefor." Code 38-1708. The plain language of our Code sections (supra) precludes an owner from testifying to the value of his goods in a single or gross amount without "giving his reasons therefor" or else showing that he has had "an opportunity for forming a correct opinion." The Georgia courts have generally so construed the statutes. See Baker v. Goddard, 205 Ga. 477
, 482 (53 SE2d 754
); Central Railroad v. Wolff, 74 Ga. 664
; Cohn v. Rigsby, 60 Ga. App. 728
, 730 (5 SE2d 93
); Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Allmond, 105 Ga. App. 763
, 766 (125 SE2d 545
). "Conclusions of witnesses are of no probative value unless the facts on which the opinions are based sustain the opinions rendered." Gordy Tire Co. v. Bulman, 98 Ga. App. 563
, 564 (106 SE2d 332
). But this court has sometimes gone astray. For example, Division 2 of the case of Warren v. State, 76 Ga. App. 243 (45 SE2d 726)
is in conflict with the statutes and with decisions of the Supreme Court. Therefore Warren together with all other cases of this court so holding is expressly overruled. The decision in National-Ben Franklin Fire Ins. Co. v. Darby, 48 Ga. App. 394 (3) (172 SE 74)
cited in Warren, is incomplete and not a fully accurate statement of the rule since it did not include either the necessity that the owner show "his reasons" for his opinion or show he had "an opportunity for forming a correct opinion."
For an excellent annotation in depth on the subject see 37 ALR.2d 967-1041. However, it should be pointed out that 9 of the annotation on pp. 987, 988 has misinterpreted the cited Georgia decisions. This is due, apparently, to the annotator's preoccupation with the erroneous holding in Warren which is here overruled.
2. On cross examination the plaintiff testified that the value of five cases of Carlings Black Label Beer, King size, had a value of $29.50 as he had paid that much for it. Without any explanation, even as to the cost price, he valued three cases of Pabst Blue Ribbon Beer at $18. When asked questions regarding the quantities of various kinds of wines for which he sued, the plaintiff testified he did not know the quantities of any kind. He expressed no opinion as to the value of the wines, nor could he have since he admitted he did not know how much he had.
According to the evidence in the record, there is absolutely no showing of value of any of the items for which plaintiff sued.
Testimony as to the cost price of an item of property standing sufficient data upon which to base an opinion as to the value of the thing. Mills v. Manum, 111 Ga. App. 396
, 397 (141 SE2d 773
). As we construe the holding in Mangum, it is twofold. (1) The cost price of an item, if coupled properly with other evidence such as a showing of the condition of the item both at the time of purchase and at the time its value is in issue, may be admitted as an element upon which an opinion may be formed as to the item's value. (2) An opinion as to value based solely on cost price is inadmissible as it has no probative value.
It follows that the testimony of the value of the five cases of Carlings Black Label Beer, $29.50, based solely as it was on its cost price has no probative value and even though admitted without objection, is insufficient to support a verdict for that amount.
The testimony as to the value of the Pabst Blue Ribbon Beer, $18, where cost price does not appear to have been the basis for the opinion, would not support a verdict for $18 for the reasons stated in Division 1 of this opinion.
3. The trial judge directed a verdict for the plaintiff although the sole issue was the value of property which, by the nature of the property, could only be determined by testimony stating the opinions of witnesses as to its value. Although it has been pointed out in the preceding divisions of this opinion that the evidence was totally insufficient to support a verdict, it is nevertheless essential for a further holding to he entered in the case that the trial judge erred in directing a verdict for the plaintiff.
Jones, 46 Ga. App. 33 (7) (166 SE 450)
; Watson v. Tompkins Chevrolet Co., 83 Ga. App. 440 (3) (63 SE2d 681)
; Atlantic C. L. R. Co. v. Clements, 92 Ga. App. 451
, 455 (88 SE2d 809
). "The evidence relied on to show the reasonable value of the rent of the land was mere opinion evidence, and such questions are always to be determined by the jury, and a verdict ought not to be directed where such evidence is involved." Bonds v. Brown, 133 Ga. 451
, 455 (66 SE 156
We are not unaware of statements of this court to the contrary. Thus the first complete paragraph on p. 257 of the case of Elder v. Woodruff Hardware &c. Co., 16 Ga. App. 255 (85 SE 268), contains erroneous statements in part and obiter in part and is specifically disapproved.
4. Defendants filed their answer in this suit in trover after its appearance date, which is thirty days after service of the petition and process. Code 81-201.
The right to open an automatic default within the fifteen-day period provided by Code 110-401 is expressly conditioned upon the payment of costs. The defendants having failed to comply with this condition, the trial court did not err in granting plaintiff's motion to strike defendants' answer. See Tuten v. Zetterower, 218 Ga. 230
, 233 (126 SE2d 752
); Thompson v. Nichols, 208 Ga. 147 (2) (65 SE2d 603)
The judgment of the trial court is reversed on the general grounds and on special ground 3 for the reasons stated in Divisions 1, 2 and 3 of this opinion. Special grounds 1 and 2 have no merit.
PANNELL, Judge, concurring specially. I concur in the judgment of reversal for the sole reason that the only testimony as to value (that of the plaintiff himself) did not demand, or authorize, the verdict directed, and this is true regardless of the cases discussed and of the various rules sponsored by the various opinions. The testimony of the plaintiff as to value was contradiction and equivocal, and construed most strongly against him did not authorize the verdict directed. It, therefore, is unnecessary to affirm or overrule any of the previous decisions of this court discussed and referred to in the opinion and relating to the probative value and legal effect of opinion evidence, and I expressly dissent, for this reason, to the overruling of any of these decisions.
I am authorized to say that Felton, C. J., Nichols, P. J., and Frankum, J., join me in this special concurrence.
EBERHARDT, Judge, concurring. Judge Hall and I are in full agreement with what is held in the majority opinion. However, we do feel that our view as to why Fulton County v. Bailey, 107 Ga. App. 512 (130 SE2d 800)
(cert. denied) is not in conflict and does not require overruling should be stated.
In that condemnation case the condemnor, whose burden it was to prove what the condemnee should recover for his land taken, introduced one expert witness who testified that the value was $11,500, and rested. At that point the condemnee was placed in the position of electing to accept the value as thus proven or contest it and show by other evidence that it was something else. The condemnee, being content with the value as asserted, accepted it and on the basis of it moved for a directed verdict. When that happened the evidence no longer occupied the status merely of opinion testimony, but rose to a level comparable to that of an agreement, thus eliminating the issue, and a verdict was demanded. While it did not have the technical attributes of an agreement, it was in that general category and the situation became analogous to trover cases brought under sales agreements, conditional sales contracts and bills of sales to secure debt, as in Fisher v. George S. Jones Co., 108 Ga. 490 (34 SE 172); Moultrie Repair Co. v. Hill, 120 Ga. 730 (5) (48 SE 143); Young v. Durham, 15 Ga. App. 678 (1) (84 SE 165); Jones v. May, 27 Ga. App. 152 (1a) (107 SE 897); Benton v. Harley, 21 Ga. App. 168 (2) (94 SE 46); Levy v. American Wholesale Co., 32 Ga. App. 103 (2) (122 SE 808); Griffeth v. Wilmore, 46 Ga. App. 481 (167 SE 914); and cf. Fussell v. Heard & Fullington, 119 Ga. 527 (46 SE 621), and Citizens Bank v. Shaw, 132 Ga. 771 (3) (65 SE 81). This would not have been the situation, of course, if there had been any other evidence as to value. Rather, it would have been a situation similar to Elder v. Woodruff Hardware &c. Co., 9 Ga. App. 484 (71 SE 806), where it was held error to have directed a verdict for the amount due under the security instrument which there was evidence that the property had less value.
The situation in Fulton County v. Bailey, 107 Ga. App. 512
, supra, a condemnation case, is analogous too, to a situation where the plaintiff in an action has alleged the value of property to be an amount and the defendant in his answer had admitted it. The issue is no longer for the jury. Of course the condemnor in Fulton County v. Bailey would not have been entitled to a directed verdict, for as to it there was only opinion testimony before the court and until the condemnee elected to accept and agree with the testimony the issue was one that could only be settled by the jury. There could have been no direction of a verdict until the testimony was raised to a higher status. Both when the condemnor offered expert testimony showing one value only, and the condemnee accepted that as satisfactory the parties had, in effect, "fixed the value as between themselves," as in Bradley v. Burkett, 82 Ga. 255
, 257 (11 SE 492
). Because of the peculiar nature of the case and the situation in Fulton County v. Bailey it is an exception that will not often occur. It would have no application in the ordinary trover suit or damage action.
BELL, P. J., JORDAN and DEEN, JJ., Addendum. It is our view that the case of Fulton County v. Bailey, 107 Ga. App. 512
, supra, should be overruled as we feel it is in conflict with decisions of the Supreme Court. The majority of the court, however, disagrees.
With respect to the other cases overruled, it is our firm conviction that it is an important duty of the appellate courts to remove from the already far too voluminous body of precedent law all cases which are wrong or else to reconcile or distinguish cases in apparent conflict. It requires more effort on the part of individual judges and the courts to do those things by the continuity of stare decisis demands that it be done. Counsel these days are plagued with reading numerous decisions on practically every point of law researched and appellate courts add immeasurably to counsel's burden by ignoring cases in conflict, or as elsewhere suggested in the report of this case, by refusing to take notice of important issues present in a case and taking the easy way out.