1. A petition on general demurrer must be construed most strongly against the pleader (Georgia Cas. &c. Co. v. Hardwick, 211 Ga. 769 (88 SE2d 394), Davis v. Johnson, 92 Ga. App. 858 (90 SE2d 426)), and ambiguous pleading is construed unfavorably to the pleader (Baggett v. Edwards, 126 Ga. 463 (1) (55 SE 250); Holbrook v. Town of Norcross, 121 Ga. 319 (1) (48 SE 922)), and pleadings which are equivocal, doubtful and subject to different interpretations are construed most strongly against the pleader on demurrer ( Richmond Concrete Products Co. v. Ward, 212 Ga. 773 (95 SE2d 677)); however, all pleadings must receive a construction in accordance with the natural intendment of the words and language used. Athens Mfg. Co. v. Rucker, 80 Ga. 291 (4 SE 885); Bell v. State Life Ins. Co., 24 Ga. App. 497 (5) (101 SE 541); Georgia Power Co. v. Leonard, 187 Ga. 608, 614 (4) (1 SE2d 579).

2. Accordingly, where in a petition by a guest passenger in a following automobile against the driver of that automobile and the driver of the lead automobile (seeking recovery for injuries received as the result of a collision between the following automobile, allegedly driven too fast and too close and the other automobile which it is alleged suddenly slowed and made a left turn without a signal or warning), there are otherwise sufficient allegations of negligence and proximate cause to set forth a cause of action against both drivers, all allegation that the plaintiff warned the driver of the following car of the impending left turn of the lead car, which warning he did not heed, and that if he had he could have slowed his speed "and thus reduced the force of the collision," (emphasis supplied) is not subject to the construction that it is an allegation that the driver of the following car, had he heeded the warning, could have avoided the collision so as to make his negligence the sole proximate cause of the injuries to the plaintiff. The trial court did not err in overruling the general demurrer of the defendant driver of the lead car to the petition as amended.

Herbert Melton Smith, a minor, through his next friend, Katie R. Smith, brought a suit for damages against Raymond Gaunt, with whom plaintiff was riding as a passenger, and Mrs. Clentis E. Bailey, the driver of the other vehicle. The petition, as amended, described the occurrence as follows: "That at the time and place alleged in this petition, the defendant Raymond Gauntt operated and drove his automobile wrongfully, unlawfully, carelessly, recklessly and with gross negligence in that he operated and drove his said automobile at a dangerous and excessively high rate of speed, to wit, at a rate of approximately 60 miles an hour, that he failed to properly steer and operate the automobile and to properly handle and control the accelerator thereon so as to slow down the automobile and to have it under his control, but on the contrary, operated and drove the automobile at a high rate of speed while in close proximity to the rear of the car operated by the defendant, Mrs. Clentis E. Bailey, at a time when the highway was wet from rain and while operating and driving his automobile in the vicinity and in front of Rosemont School at a time when students of tender years, teachers and employees at said school were proceeding to school and to work creating a congested and dangerous condition and an additional traffic hazard in the area which was known to the defendant.

"That when the defendant, Mrs. Clentis E. Bailey, slowed her car and began to make a left hand turn, the plaintiff, Herbert Melton Smith, told the defendant, Raymond Gauntt, that the car ahead was slowing down but the defendant, Raymond Gauntt, failed to heed the plaintiff's warning but continued to drive his car at a high rate of speed and failed to apply his brakes until he was so close to the car being driven by Mrs. Clentis E. Bailey that he could not slow his speed and thus reduce the force of the collision, but drove his car into the rear of the car being driven by Mrs. Clentis E. Bailey with great force and violence."

The petition otherwise sufficiently alleged that the injuries received by plaintiff were the proximate cause of the joint negligence of the two defendants, and specific acts of negligence were alleged against the two defendants, gross negligence as to Raymond Gauntt, and ordinary negligence as to Mrs. Clentis E. Bailey.