The judgment of the trial court in reversing the Industrial Loan Commissioner's holding that a small loan license was void is affirmed.

On January 10, 1963, the Industrial Loan Commissioner approved a license enabling C. & S. Loans, Inc., upon the application of L. K. Stevens, to engage in the business of making small loans. In actuality, the corporate existence of C. & S. Loans, Inc. did not begin until the following day. On January 14, Stevens testified that he told the Commissioner about the beginning time of the corporate existence and asked whether the license should be reissued. At that time, the Commissioner reaffirmed the license and said that reissuing it would be an unnecessary clerical burden. The term of the then incumbent Commissioner, as well as the employment of Stevens as examiner in the Industrial Loan Division of the Comptroller's Office, ended the next day on January 15.

In February 1963, the new Industrial Loan Commissioner ordered Stevens, as president of C. & S. Loans, Inc., to show cause concerning the force and effect of the license, and, after hearing, the new Commissioner declared the license void ab initio. His order of April 8, 1963, was based on findings that: Stevens' application filed in January 1963 was pre-dated July 10, 1962; Stevens was an employee in the Commissioner's office when he applied for and was granted the loan license; that C. & S. Loans was not incorporated until after the license was granted; that all but three shares of the corporation's capital stock was sold to other persons by Stevens; and that Stevens did not disclose the sale of stock to the Commissioner.

On appeal, the trial court set aside the Commissioner's order of April 8, 1963, on the statutory grounds that the Commissioner acted in excess of his powers; that there is not sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the Commissioner in making the order complained of; and that the order complained of is contrary to law. From this judgment the incumbent Commissioner brings this appeal.

The Industrial Loan Commissioner served written notice on C. & S. Loans, Inc. to show cause why the company's license under the Georgia Industrial Loan Act should not be revoked or suspended. The proceeding was brought under Section 12 of Ga. L. 1955, pp. 431-438 (Code Ann. 25-312).

The specific charges which the Commissioner set forth in his show-cause order were as follows: "(a) At the time of this application and at the time of issuance of the license, no charter had been issued to C. & S. Loans Incorporated. (b) Section 7 of the Georgia Industrial Loan Act (Code Section 25-307 Georgia Code Annotated) mandatorily requires that every application for a small loan license must be in writing on forms prescribed by the Commissioner. The writing on which this license was granted is not complete in that it does not show a completed balance sheet or the signature of the secretary of the Corporation and, therefore, does not meet the requirement of a form prescribed by the Commissioner as set out within this Section."

The section of the Industrial Loan Act under which the revocation or suspension of the defendant's license was sought specifically limits the authority of the Commissioner to suspend or revoke any license if the Commissioner finds: "(1) that the licensee has failed to pay the annual license fee, or any fee required under this Act, or (2) that the licensee knowingly has violated any of the provisions of this Act." It is to be seen at once that neither of these grounds was included in the Commissioner's written notice to the licensee. It necessarily follows that the Commissioner in proceeding upon grounds other than those authorized in seeking to revoke or to suspend the license acted in excess of his authority.

The necessary result of the hearing held is that the present Commissioner in effect attempted to sit as an appellate reviewer of the actions of his predecessor so as to determine whether the former properly exercised his discretion and authority. This the Commissioner is not authorized to do in a proceeding "to suspend or revoke" a license.

3. In view of the holdings in Divisions 1 and 2 of this opinion to the effect that the hearing before the Commissioner was invalid, it is perhaps superfluous for us to say that none of the facts found would have supported the Commissioner's revoking or suspending a license had the hearing been a proper one. The predecessor Commissioner knew of the delay in the effective date of the beginning of the legal existence of the corporation, and he did not abuse his discretion in considering the matter cured by the subsequent completion of the incorporation proceedings. The method of financing, while certainly not an exemplary one, is not prohibited by the statute. The issuance of a license to an employee of the Commissioner's office, although admittedly a sorry and even reprehensible practice, nevertheless is not precluded by the Act. The application form was before the then Commissioner, and the factual determination as to its sufficiency was his alone to decide. While all of these facts found would have been material in the Commissioner's initial determination whether the license should have been issued or denied under Code Ann. 25-308, they cannot be pertinent in an attempted later review of the grant of the license by the Commissioner under Code Ann. 25-312.

Judgment affirmed. Hall and Pannell, JJ., concur.