The trial court did not err in overruling all the general and special demurrers to the plaintiff's petitions as amended.

Mary Louise Nickle and her husband, W. H. Nickle individually brought separate suits in the City Court of Savannah against Armstrong Furniture Co., Inc., and against W. L. Rule, her petition seeking to recover of the defendants below, $150,000 and his seeking $100,000, in damages on account of certain personal injuries to her and damages to his automobile which were sustained by reason of the defendants' alleged negligence. The plaintiffs' amended petitions set forth substantially the following facts: On October 7, 1959, about 5:20 p.m., Mrs. Nickle was driving her husband's automobile in an eastwardly direction on Bay Street Extension between the Bay Street Viaduct and West Broad Street in the City of Savannah. She stopped her automobile in the right-hand lane for about four seconds because the congested traffic ahead of her had stopped. The proper stop signal was given by a stop light on the rear of her automobile. While she was stopped, a truck owned by defendant Armstrong Furniture Co., Inc., and driven by its employee, defendant W. L. Rule, in the course of his employment, hit the plaintiff's automobile from the rear with a sudden and terrific force. There was nothing obscuring the view of the defendant driver at the time of the impact. Mrs. Nickle suffered, as a result of the collision, a strained or wrenched back and neck and torn, strained, ripped, bruised and dislocated nerves, vertebrae, ligaments and muscles in and about her shoulder region, and a whiplash injury, all of which caused her great pain, mental anguish and impairment of health and required medical treatment and hospitalization for over three weeks. She was the mother of two children, and as the result of the above-mentioned injuries she was unable to discharge her duties as a mother and a housewife, and she was forced to resign from a $300 per month secretarial job. The aforesaid damages were all proximately caused by the following acts of negligence of the defendants: (a) By operating the truck aforesaid at the time and place aforesaid without due care and circumspection, (b) because said defendant failed to stop the aforesaid truck before running into the rear of the aforesaid automobile, and (c) because said defendant failed to drive and direct the aforesaid truck to the left of the aforesaid automobile at a safe distance and thus avoid the impact hereinbefore described.

The defendants' renewed general and special demurrers to the plaintiffs' amended petitions were overruled and it is to these rulings of the trial court that the plaintiffs in error except.

1. The plaintiffs' petitions, as amended, set out causes of action against the defendants and were not subject to the general demurrers interposed by the defendants.

2. The defendants attacked by special demurrer paragraph 3 of the plaintiffs' petitions, as amended, in which the plaintiffs' two minor children are named, as being irrelevant, immaterial and prejudicial to the defendants. A plaintiff is entitled to plead allegations which are germane to the cause, even though harmful and prejudicial to the defendant. Turner v. Joiner, 77 Ga. App. 603 (48 SE2d 907). Since the husband's petition seeks damages for the loss of services of his wife, and the wife's petition seeks damages for loss of her ability to discharge her duties as a mother, it is reasonable to allow the plaintiffs to allege that they do in fact have two minor children, since this fact is material in that the jury may consider it in arriving at the amount of damages, should they render a verdict for the plaintiffs. There was no error in overruling the demurrers on the grounds urged.

3. The defendants demurred specially to paragraph 6 of the amended petitions saying that the statement that the defendant Rule was informed of plaintiff, Mrs. Nickle's, intent and purpose to stop said automobile by the stop lights on the rear of said automobile is a conclusion of the pleader without sufficient facts to substantiate same. Code Ann. 68-1648 (a), cited by the plaintiffs in error for the purpose of showing that the brake light on defendant in error's automobile was not a proper signal for an automobile coming to a stop, states in part: "Any stop or turn signal when required herein shall be given either by means of the hand and arm or by a signal lamp or lamps or mechanical signal device . . ." (Italics ours). Since under this Code section "signal lamps" are approved as a stop signal, the plaintiff in error could be said to have been informed of the intent of Mrs. Nickle to stop, and therefore this demurrer is not well taken.

5. The demurrer to paragraph 8, which says that the allegation that there was nothing obscuring the view of the defendant driver to keep him from knowing that the plaintiff's automobile was at a complete stop, was a conclusion of the pleader, is likewise without merit. If the plaintiff's view of the truck approaching from the rear was unobscured, the allegation that the truck driver's view forward was likewise unobscured is not an unjustified conclusion. If, in fact, there had been something obscuring the defendant's view, this might have been set up as a defense.

6. The demurrers to paragraphs 9(d) of the petitions, which say that "mental anguish" is not an element of damages for which a recovery may be had, and should be stricken from the petition as irrelevant, immaterial and prejudicial to the defendants, is also without merit. "The general rule of law in this State is that damages can not be recovered for mental anguish and physical pain resulting from mere negligence, unaccompanied by any physical injury to the person or pecuniary loss," (Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Knight, 16 Ga. App. 203, 204, 84 SE 986), but the plaintiff's "mental anguish" is alleged to have resulted from the physical injury, and "there may be a recovery for mental suffering resulting directly from a physical injury . . ." Davis v. Murray, 29 Ga. App. 120 (1) (113 SE 827).

7. The demurrer to paragraph 10 of the petitions objects to the reference to the plaintiff's "former good health and strength" as being conclusions of the pleader. The assessment of one's own health and strength at any given time, considered from a general rather than a technical point of view, is a matter of ultimate fact, and not a mere conclusion. The objection that the allegation in Mrs. Nickle's petitions that she "has had almost daily medical treatment," was vague, indefinite and uncertain, is without merit.

10. The plaintiff husband's itemization of damages added by amendment is stated with sufficient particularity to withstand the defendants' demurrers.

The trial court did not err in overruling all of the defendants' demurrers to the plaintiffs' petitions as amended.

Judgments affirmed. Bell and Hall, JJ., concur.