The petition does not state a cause of action, and the trial court did not err in sustaining the general demurrer and in dismissing it.

Atlanta Realty Company, Inc., and their agent, Bennie Isenberg, brought this action against the defendant Abe Podber for breach of an alleged verbal contract between the respective parties, which allegedly involved a promise of the defendant that he would see that the plaintiff received his commission in case the defendant bought a certain grocery store which the plaintiffs had for sale under a verbal contract with the owner, Morton Paller. Prior to the transaction between the present parties, the plaintiffs and Paller, the owner, had entered into a verbal agreement to secure a purchaser for the grocery store at an asking price of $20,000 and a selling price of $16,000. The plaintiffs admit that there was no exclusive right granted to them by the owner to handle the sale. They were to receive $1,000 commission on the sale of the store under this verbal agreement.

On or about September 13, 1959, the plaintiffs ran an ad in the newspaper offering the store for sale, in response to which the defendant called the plaintiff Isenberg and inquired about the store. Isenberg stated he would not give out information concerning the store, but he would be glad to show the store to the defendant. The defendant then replied that there was no need to do that, but that if the petitioner would tell him where the store was "and give him the details,' that he would protect him and see that petitioner received his commission in case he purchased said business." At some time subsequent, and without any further action by the plaintiffs, the defendant and Paller consummated a sale of the grocery store. The plaintiffs demanded their commission from both Paller and the defendant. Both refused to pay. The petitioners admit that Paller, the seller, refused to pay the commission and that there is no legal contractual obligation upon him to pay the commission or any part thereof. On the contrary, the petitioners contend that the defendant by virtue of the above facts is indebted to them to the extent of "$1,000 or a pro rata amount based upon the selling price of said business." The defendant filed a general demurrer and several special demurrers. The trial court sustained the general demurrer and did not pass on the special demurrers. To this order of the trial court the plaintiffs excepted.

The so-called contract sued on allegedly arises between the parties from the verbal statement of the defendant to the plaintiff Isenberg that if Isenberg would tell the defendant where the grocery store was which Isenberg had listed for sale, and give him the details, that he, the defendant, "would protect him and would see that petitioner received his commission in case he purchased said business." As this verbal agreement is set forth in the petition, it is not at all clear as to who is to pay the commission, This vague and nebulous statement is capable of at least two possible interpretations: (1) That the defendant buyer would see to it that the seller would pay the commission; or (2) that if the defendant purchased the business the defendant would pay the commission.

Applying the elemental principle that on demurrer the allegations of the petition are construed more strongly against the pleader, the language must be construed as meaning that the defendant would see to it that the seller would pay the commission. However, the petition affirmatively alleges: "Morton Paller, the seller, refused to pay the commission and there is no legal contractional [sic] obligation upon him to pay said commission or any part thereof."

It is obvious that this petition does not state a cause of action, and the trial court properly sustained the general demurrer.

Judgment affirmed. Felton, C. J., and Nichols, J., concur.