If one who makes a motion for a new trial, in due and seasonable time presents a beef of evidence, evincing a fair and bona fide effort to comply with the law, but which is imperfect or incorrect in certain particulars, the proper practice is not to dismiss the motion for new trial at once because of such imperfections, but to allow a reasonable opportunity to correct them.

Marvin G. Pound sued Percy L. Dunn in the Municipal Court of Augusta on a note. The case was heard before Honorable Albert G. Ingram, judge pro hac vice, without the intervention of a jury and a judgment for the defendant was rendered. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion for new trial relying on the usual general grounds, and when the same came on to be heard the following judgment was rendered: "Foregoing presented and proposed brief of evidence submitted, on this November 23, 1959, at l o'clock, p.m., it is ordered: That motion for new trial be heard instanter. Said motion coming on thusly to be heard, and court being fully advised in premises it is considered, ordered and adjudged that: (1) That counsel being unable to agree on brief of evidence, the same is hereby disallowed. (2) There being no proper brief of evidence submitted, said motion for new trial is hereby overruled. (3) Said motion for new trial is hereby overruled on each and every count." It is to this judgment that the plaintiff now excepts.

" 'If one who makes a motion for a new trial in due and seasonable time presents a brief of the evidence, evincing a fair and bona fide effort to comply with the law, but which is imperfect or incorrect in certain particulars, the proper practice is not to dismiss the motion for new trial at once because of such imperfections, but to allow a reasonable opportunity to correct them. If the movant fails or refuses to do so, the motion may be dismissed.' Norred v. State, 127 Ga. 347 (3) (56 S. E. 464)." Cannon v. Gaines, 199 Ga. 277 (3) (34 S. E. 2d 103).

In the Cannon case, supra, the Supreme Court applied the above law and held: "Under the rule quoted in the preceding paragraph, as applied to the facts of the instant case, the judge erred in entering a final order disapproving the brief of evidence and denying a new trial, without first allowing the movant reasonable opportunity to correct whatever errors there were in the brief of evidence as tendered for approval, it not appearing that the judge did not remember the evidence. Central Railroad & Banking Co. v. Pool, 95 Ga. 410 (2) (22 S. E. 631); Price v. High, 108 Ga. 145, 149 (33 S. E. 956); McAdams v. State, 9 Ga. App. 166 (3) (70 S. E. 893); Bugg v. State, 13 Ga. App. 672 (2) (79 S. E. 748); Nixon v. Growers Exchange Finance Corp., 42 Ga. App. 642 (157 S. E. 119); Camp v. Curry-Arrington. Co., 46 Ga. App. 17 (166 S. E. 428); Glass v. Brown, 49 Ga. App. 610 (4) (176 S. E. 519); Griffin v. State, 50 Ga. App. 214 (177 S. E. 512); Scott v. State, 53 Ga. App. 61 (4) (185 S. E. 131); Stokes v. State, 67 Ga. App. 276 (19 S. E. 2d 842)." In the present case it appears that the trial judge refused to approve the brief of evidence because "counsel" could not agree that the same was correct and instanter overruled the plaintiff's motion for new trial without pointing out the inaccuracies in such brief of evidence, and, since it does not appear that the trial judge could not remember the evidence, the judgment complained of must be reversed.