The evidence demands a finding that the deceased employee met his death in the course of his employment and as the result of an accident growing out of it. The defense of the employer that the employee met his death through his own wilful misconduct is not supported by the evidence.

F. G. Davis died as the result of an automobile accident during the course of employment by J. B. McCrary Co., Inc. His widow brought an action for death benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The hearing director denied compensation and this award was affirmed by the full board. The Judge of the Superior Court of Clinch County reversed it, and this judgment is here assigned as error.

The director stated in his findings of fact that Davis left Homerville, Georgia, at about 3:30 or 4 p.m. on February 1, 1957, to take an oil pan used in the project which he was directing to Pearson for repair, returning after midnight, and the director found that the death was due to the wilful misconduct on the employee based on testimony that at about 3:30 on 4 p.m. one witness had detected a smell of what he considered to be whisky on the employee's breath; that at about 5 p.m. he bought a pint of whisky, that at about that time he drank one bottle or part of a bottle of beer and at some time between 10 and 12 he had coffee and sandwiches, and there was an odor of liquor on him. The witness who testified to this stated on direct examination that the employee was not drunk and was not drinking. On cross-examination he admitted to a prior statement that he was "under the influence." On redirect examination he said he stated this because of the odor of alcohol; that the employee's actions were normal and he was not under the influence to the extent that it would affect his driving. Except for the beer, none of the witnesses who were with the defendant most of the time between 5 p.m. and midnight saw him drink anything. The car which the deceased was driving while returning to Homerville after leaving the oil pan to be welded left the pavement at around 3 a.m., turned over three or four times and came to rest a distance of 183 feet away, from which one of the witnesses estimated that it was traveling about 90 miles per hour. A witness 4 1/2 miles from the scene saw an automobile of the same general description as that of the deceased and followed by another go past his place at a fast rate of speed about 25 minutes before he heard of the accident. A pint bottle of whisky was found, about one-third full, the top missing, standing upright between the body of the deceased and the automobile. Upon this testimony the director based his finding of wilful misconduct on the part of the employee.

Code 114-105 provides: "No compensation shall be allowed for an injury or death due to the employee's wilful misconduct, including intentionally self-inflicted injury, or growing out of his attempt to injure another, or due to intoxication or wilful failure or refusal to use a safety appliance or perform a duty required by statute . . . The burden of proof shall be upon him who claims an exemption or forfeiture under this section." "Wilful misconduct" means violations which are conscious or intentional, not those which are inadvertent, unconscious or involuntary. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Carroll, 169 Ga. 333 (1d) (150 S. E. 208). The evidence here is entirely circumstantial, and where one having the burden of establishing a point relies upon circumstantial evidence to prove an issue, the evidence must not only be consistent with the conclusion sought to be established, but must also be inconsistent with every other reasonable hypothesis. Sixth St. Corp. v. Daniel, 80 Ga. App. 680 (57 S. E. 2d 210). Such party has not, in a reasonable sense, submitted any evidence for the consideration of the triors of fact until the circumstances proved not only reasonably support the conclusion but also render less probable all inconsistent conclusions. White v. Executive Comm. of Baptist Convention, 65 Ga. App. 840 (16 S. E. 2d 605). That these rules apply to workmen's compensation cases, see Carpenter v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 93 Ga. App. 213 (91 S. E. 2d 199).

Intoxication does not consist merely in having partaken of intoxicating liquor, or in being to some extent under the influence of it. Drunkenness, or intoxication, is a condition where one is under the influence of intoxicating liquors to the extent that he is not entirely at himself, or his judgment is impaired, and his acts or words or conduct is visibly and noticeably affected." P. 725. Here, the only witness who testified that the deceased was "under the influence" said he based this conclusion on the odor on his breath, and that he showed no effects of the alcohol and was not under the influence to the extent that it was less safe for him to drive. The only possible distinction between the Parks case and this case is that there some positive testimony existed to the effect that the car was in bad mechanical condition. The court quoted in reference thereto: "When the evidence tends equally to sustain either of two inconsistent propositions, neither of them can be said to have been established by legitimate proof." Here there was evidence that the employee complained of having had little sleep the night before, and he was feeling ill during the afternoon and employed another person to drive him around for about three hours. He did not go to bed on the night in question, and his car was wrecked while he was going home at about 3 a.m. the following morning. The evidence relating to the car leaving the road is equally as consistent with the fact that the employee was ill, went to sleep, or had some other physical difficulty, as it is with the fact that his car left the road due to his intoxication. Since there is no evidence whatever that the accident occurred because of the intoxication of the deceased except as it may arise from an inference that he was drunk, and since the existence of a drunken condition can only arise as an inference from the testimony of witnesses that they smelled alcohol on his breath during the afternoon, when, according to their testimony he was not drunk, to allow this conclusion would constitute pyramiding an inference on an inference. Ga. Ry. & Elec. Co. v. Harris, 1 Ga. App. 714, 718 (57 S. E. 1076). The deceased did have a pint bottle of liquor, unopened, at 9 p.m. There was a pint bottle, over half empty, found at the scene, but the circumstances make it impossible to accept this as proof that the missing quantity of liquor had been drunk by the deceased. The bottle was standing upright on the ground beside the road with the cap off, after the car had turned over two or three times, and the likelihood that it Would have landed upright in an open condition on that rough terrain without spilling any of its contents seems slight. Accordingly, all of the evidence is insufficient to sustain the finding that the cause of the death of claimant's husband was his wilful misconduct in driving while in an intoxicated condition.

The judge of the superior court did not err in reversing the award denying compensation.

Judgment affirmed. Gardner, P. J., and Carlisle, J., concur.