l. Questions of negligence, whose negligence and what negligence are questions to be determined by a jury. The jury in the instant case, after considering the evidence before them, properly resolved the case against the plaintiff.

2. Where, as here, the trial court charged fully and clearly on all phases of law involved in a case, reversible error may not be shown based on complaints regarding isolated excerpts from the charge. In the instant case the court did not err in any respect in the charge or in failure to charge on any point.

Eunice S. Blankenship, hereinafter called the plaintiff, brought suit against R. H. Howard, herein after called the defendant, for damages arising out of an accident in which the plaintiff's husband was killed. The defendant filed his answer and later amended it. The suit came on for trial before a jury and a verdict was rendered in favor of the defendant, whereupon the plaintiff made a motion for a new trial which motion was denied. It is on this judgment that the case is here for review.

The petition shows jurisdiction in paragraphs 1 and 2 and alleges substantially in paragraph 3 that the plaintiff is the widow of J. L. Blankenship; in paragraph 4 that her husband was killed in a collision between his truck and one driven by Tommy Jones; in paragraph 5 that the truck driven by the deceased was owned by him; in paragraph 6 that the vehicle driven by Tommy Jones was owned by the defendant; in paragraph 7 that Tommy Jones was the agent, employee and servant of the defendant; in paragraph 8 that at the time of the collision on May 23, 1955, Tommy Jones was operating the defendant's vehicle as his agent, employee and servant; in paragraph 9 that at the time of the collision said Tommy Jones was operating the defendant's vehicle while in the scope of his employment and upon the business and for the benefit of the defendant; in paragraph 10 that the defendant is responsible and liable for the negligent acts of his agent, employee and servant, Tommy Jones; in paragraphs 11, 12 and 13 that on May 23, 1955, at about 9:30 a.m. the deceased was driving his 1954 Chevrolet truck loaded with saw logs south along U. S. Highway 411 at a point about 3 miles below Etowah, Tennessee, traveling upgrade and in his right lane of traffic at a rate of speed not in excess of twenty miles per hour and maintaining a lookout ahead and at all times had his vehicle under control; in paragraph 14 that the defendant's agent, employee and servant, Tommy Jones, was driving the defendant's tractor-trailer north along said highway at a rate of speed in excess of forty miles per hour down grade and entering a curve, an automobile immediately in front and also one immediately following him, two automobiles besides the plaintiff's husband's truck approaching from the north and defendant's truck carrying a load in excess of 40,000 pounds, such excess speed under these circumstances amounting to negligence, and such negligence proximately contributed to the collision of said vehicles and the consequent death of the plaintiff's husband; in paragraph 15 that when the deceased reached a point approximately 15 feet north of the defendant's truck, the driver of the defendant's truck cut sharply and suddenly to his left across the center line striking the deceased's truck on the left front bumper, fender and wheel, forcing it upon the shoulder of the highway and killing the deceased; in paragraph 16 that the deceased's truck was struck by the defendant's vehicle with such force that the front wheel, engine and transmission were knocked completely out of place; in paragraph 17 that the deceased's truck was struck by the right front bumper, fender and wheel of the defendant's vehicle; in paragraph 18 that said collision occurred on a curve to the right as the highway goes north; in paragraph 19 that the deceased was and had been traveling upgrade for a distance of approximately 1000 feet before he reached the point of collision; in paragraph 20 that the defendant's vehicle was and had been traveling downgrade for a distance of approximately 2000 feet before it reached the point of impact; in paragraph 21 that the defendant was guilty of negligence per se or as a matter of law for that the defendant's agent, employee and servant in operation of the defendant's vehicle was violating certain statutes of the State of Tennessee. Then follow quotations from Tennessee code sections relating to speed limits for trucks; reckless driving generally; maximum weight allowances; reckless driving as to inadequate or improperly adjusted brakes, driving to the left of the center of the road and excessive speed under certain circumstances and traffic conditions; passing vehicles; and brake requirements. The plaintiff further alleges in her petition in paragraph 22 that the defendant's agent, employee and servant who was in charge of and operating the defendant's vehicle on this occasion violated said Tennessee code sections, and such amounted to negligence as a matter of law and was the proximate cause of the collision which resulted in the death of the plaintiff's husband; in paragraphs 23 and 24 that the plaintiff is the wife of the deceased J. L. Blankenship and has the right to bring suit for a certain measure of damages under Tennessee statutes; in paragraphs 25 and 26 that at the time of plaintiff's husband's death he was 51 years of age, in good health and had a reasonable life expectancy of 20 years; and that he was capable of earning $250 per month for which plaintiff prays recovery of $31,893.

The defendant's answer alleges substantially admission of paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 18; denial of paragraphs 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 21, 22 and 26; and neither admits nor denies for lack of sufficient information the allegations of paragraphs 2, 23, 24, and 25 of the petition, and further admits the allegations of paragraph 11 of the petition except as to the distance from Etowah which defendant does not admit; admits paragraph 19 that the deceased was traveling upgrade but does not know the distance and that the upgrade at the point of the collision was very slight; admits paragraph 20 in that defendant's vehicle was traveling down grade at the point of collision but does not know the distance down grade before the point of impact, and further defendant alleges that there is a viaduct south of the point of impact and a long upgrade for northbound traffic south of the viaduct and the defendant's truck had been driven at a speed of only 15 to 20 miles per hour just south of said viaduct.

The defendant further answered the plaintiff's petition alleging substantially in paragraph 27 that the plaintiff's husband was driving his truck in excess of 50 miles per hour entering a curve with at least two or three southbound automobiles immediately in front of him and three northbound automobiles and the defendant's vehicle approaching from the south and further the deceased's truck was loaded with logs weighing in excess of 40,000 pounds, and therefore to operate said truck in excess of forty miles per hour under these circumstances amounted to negligence as a matter of fact and said negligence proximately contributed to the collision of said vehicles; in paragraph 28 that the deceased pulled his over-loaded log truck out into his left lane of traffic while going up grade and passing two or three cars ahead of him; in paragraph 29 that the deceased continued to drive his overloaded truck on his left side of the road completely blocking the same for northbound traffic and forced cars ahead of the defendant's vehicle off the road onto the right shoulder; in paragraph 30 that in spite of the fact that the deceased's truck was entering a curve and the way ahead was not clear he continued to drive on his left side of the road, and after forcing the cars ahead of the defendant's vehicle off the road, crashed his truck into the defendant's vehicle totally demolishing it, killing a passenger and severely injuring the driver; in paragraph 31 that the impact of the log truck with the defendant's vehicle occurred on the defendant's right or east side of the road; in paragraph 32 that the deceased's death was solely and proximately caused by his own negligence and he was also guilty of negligence as a matter of law in violating certain Tennessee statutes which were quoted thereafter and concerned speed limits for trucks; reckless driving; maximum weight allowance; reckless driving as to having vehicle under control and with adequate brakes, driving in proper lane, excessive speed under certain circumstances and traffic conditions; and passing vehicles; in paragraph 33 that the defendant's driver, Tommy Jones, was not negligent in any manner whatsoever; that the deceased's death occurred in the State of Tennessee and in the absence of a well pleaded and proven statute of the State of Tennessee, the legal presumption arises that the common law was and is in effect in that State; in paragraph 34 that under common law contributory negligence bars a recovery and that the deceased was guilty of contributory negligence in that he drove his log truck on the wrong side of the road at a speed in excess of 50 miles per hour and attempted to pass two or three cars when the way ahead was not clear.

The defendant then amended his answer by adding the following which alleges substantially that the deceased was driving a truck on which the brakes were defective and inadequate and that the deceased was guilty of negligence per se or as a matter of law in violating certain statutes of the State of Tennessee concerning brakes and brake equipment.

The testimony shows substantially as follows: George Cockburn testified that he is an employee of the Connasauga Lumber Company and was in the habit of hauling logs along the highway where the accident occurred; that he did not witness the accident but arrived on the scene some thirty minutes later. He described the wreckage, identified pictures taken at the scene, and stated that there were skid marks on the pavement on the right and left side of the road and that the debris which was knocked off the trucks was lying west of the center line and the truck the deceased was driving was traveling south; that the skid marks of the defendant's vehicle began on the east side going north fifty or sixty feet then continued across the line to the west side of the highway ending where the truck stopped; that the right hand side of the defendant's vehicle bore the major part of the impact as it struck the left front end of the deceased's truck tearing it out completely and knocking the truck in a northerly direction; that he estimated the speed of the defendant's vehicle to be approximately 50 to 60 miles per hour; that he estimated the weight load of the deceased's log truck to be between 22,000 and 24,000 pounds gross weight. On cross-examination the witness testified that the log truck had a tandem on it and there were brakes on the tandem which were not hooked up; that the brakes on the defendant's lumber truck were broken when he saw them after the wreck; that according to the tags carried by both vehicles the defendant's lumber truck was authorized to carry a gross weight of 55,980 pounds by a P-8 tag whereas the deceased's log truck carried a P-4 tag which indicated a lesser weight allowance and the witness estimated its weight to be between 22,000 and 24,000 pounds but not over 24,000 pounds.

Causby Bowers, also an employee of the Connasauga Lumber Company, testified that he arrived on the scene shortly afterwards but that he was not an eyewitness to the collision. His testimony was similar to that given by the witness Cockburn.

H. L. Jackson, Elon Tankersley, and the plaintiff testified as to the deceased's age, health, earnings and family status at the time of his death.

A Mr. Harrison, testifying on behalf of the defendant, testified that he was traveling along the same road on the same day in a northerly direction just ahead of the defendant's lumber truck, there being only one car between his car and the lumber truck; that he first observed the deceased's log truck in a line of traffic approaching in the opposite direction; that the witness was traveling approximately 35 to 45 miles per hour; that the log truck pulled out across the center line into the east lane of traffic and the witness immediately applied his brakes; that the log truck passed one vehicle which had been ahead of it in the line of traffic and was heading toward him; that he glanced in his rear view mirror and saw that the car and the lumber truck were close behind him, whereupon he shoved his car into second gear and drove off the pavement onto the shoulder of the road, at which time the log truck passed him in the east lane of traffic; that the little car between the witness and the lumber truck drove off onto the shoulder of the road right behind the witness; that the witness did not see the log truck and the lumber truck again until after they had hit; that when he brought his car to a stop on the shoulder he looked back and saw that they had collided.

Mrs. Alma Smith, wife of the driver of the automobile which was directly in front of the lumber truck, testified that they were traveling approximately forty or forty-five miles per hour; that she first observed the log truck approaching from the opposite direction as they got to where they could see around the curve in the road; that the log truck was passing two or three cars coming up the hill toward them, the log truck being on their side of the road; that Mr. Harrison's car was directly in front of their car; that Mr. Harrison slowed his car down and pulled off the pavement to the right and they followed him, getting partially off the road as the log truck passed them; that the lumber truck directly behind them struck their left rear fender as they pulled off the road and at the same time she heard the impact of the collision between the lumber truck and the log truck; that the lumber truck was in the right lane when it struck their car; and that the impact occurred on a grade and a curve.

Tommy Jones, the driver of the defendant's lumber truck, testified substantially that he suffered a skull fracture in the wreck, which rendered him unconscious and put him in the hospital for eight days and he had no recollection of the collision; that he had been working for the defendant for some ten or twelve years, had had much experience driving trucks; and that his brakes were in good condition on the day in question. On cross-examination the witness testified that he knew from past experience that he would have applied the proper brakes to give the proper braking action and prevent the truck from "jack-knifing" but that he did not remember putting on the brakes at the time of the collision.

Mr. Harold Tingle, a minister, testified that he was driving in the line of traffic directly behind the lumber truck; that as they passed the crest of the hill and were traveling down grade, the road curving to their right ahead of them, he saw the log truck in their lane passing cars; that the lumber truck then obstructed his view of the log truck; that he saw the lumber truck's brake lights go on and thought that the two were going to collide so he pulled off the road onto the shoulder at which time he heard the impact; that he estimated the lumber truck's speed to be about twenty-five miles per hour; that when he saw the lumber truck's brake lights flash on, it was in his own right lane, and that afterwards he helped minister to the injured and did not observe many of the details of the wrecked vehicles.

R. H. Howard, the defendant, testified that his lumber truck which was involved in the collision was practically new, that is, it had only 7,000 miles on it, and it had straight air brakes on it which were in good working condition. On cross-examination he testified that the lumber truck was carrying a little over nine thousand feet of lumber and weighed around ten thousand pounds and he testified further concerning the distance required to stop such a loaded trailer at various speeds.

1. We have set out the evidence somewhat in detail. The evidence was submitted to a jury, who found against the plaintiff. After a careful study of the evidence as it developed at the trial, we are constrained to hold that the jury arrived at the correct verdict, under the record before us. In our opinion there was sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict of the jury and that such verdict should not be set aside by this court. The facts are unlike the facts in Porter v. Kolb, 46 Ga. 266. The general grounds are not meritorious.

Counsel for the plaintiff allege that such charge is erroneous because it is not a correct statement of the law under all the conditions and circumstances involved in the case now before us; that if there is any evidence of gross or wanton negligence on the part of the defendant, contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff's deceased husband would not be a bar to recovery on the part of the plaintiff. Special grounds 5, 7, 8 and 9 are directed to this same excerpt from the charge and special grounds 2, 3 and 6 are directed to closely related excerpts.

The questions raised by this record are briefly: (a) Whether or not the court correctly applied the contributory-negligence rule when instructing the jury that the plaintiff would be barred from recovery if her husband were guilty of any negligence which was the proximate cause of the collision; (b) Whether or not the court correctly presumed that the law of Tennessee was the common law as interpreted by the Georgia courts. It will be noted that special ground 4 also goes to this issue; (c) Whether or not the court excluded the defense that contributory negligence will not bar recovery if the defendant's negligence is gross or wanton in character.

The contention contained in (a) is without merit in view of many decisions of this court and the Supreme Court including Tuten v. Atlantic Coast Life R. Co., 4 Ga. App. 353 (61 S. E. 511); Minter v. Kent, 62 Ga. App. 265, 270 (8 S. E. 2d 109) and Southland Butane Gas Co. v. Blackwell, 211 Ga. 665, 666 (88 S. E. 2d 6). Contention (b) is not meritorious in view of the following decisions: Slaton v. Hall, 168 Ga. 710 (148 S. E. 741, 73 A.L.R. 891); Hines v. Evitt, 25 Ga. App. 606 (3, 4) (103 S. E. 865) and Craven v. Brighton Mills, 87 Ga. App. 126 (73 S. E. 2d 248). Contention (c) is not meritorious because the court charged elsewhere as to the exception to this rule where the defendant is guilty of gross or wanton negligence, and the charge as a whole offers no such contradictory instructions as to mislead and confuse the jury. There is also a contention raised by a number of these special grounds to the effect that, since the defendant pleaded, and the stipulation admitted, a number of Tennessee statutes relating to traffic regulations, that the applicable statutes of Tennessee were in fact pleaded and there is left no room in the case for the presumption that the law of Tennessee is the common law as interpreted by Georgia courts. The presumption was applied, not to statutes specifying what is negligence, but to rules of law on the effect of negligence, as to which no statutes were pleaded or proved. Consequently, this contention also is without merit. Therefore special grounds 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 are not meritorious.

3. The remaining ground, special ground 10, complains that the "last clear chance" doctrine was not covered in the general charge. There was no request to charge on the doctrine, there were no pleadings relating thereto, and even the evidence upon which such a charge might have been predicated is slight. There was accordingly no reversible error committed in falling to charge on this rule of law. See Wright v. Bales, 62 Ga. App. 328 (7 S. E. 2d 765) where it was held that the doctrine of last clear chance is but a phase of proximate cause, and, where the general charge substantially sets forth the rules of law by which the jury must be guided in determining proximate cause, specific instructions should be requested on this rule if they are desired by the parties.

The court did not err in denying the motion for new trial.

Judgment affirmed. Townsend and Carlisle, JJ., concur.