Where the Carlisle Mortality Table is introduced as evidence in a case and sent to the jury to be used in determining the amount of damages to be recovered, the court should charge clearly and distinctly as to when the table should and should not be used.

J. A. Newman brought suit against the Brookhaven Supply Company and Sidney Mulligan. The suit is a personal injury suit alleging that the defendants damaged the plaintiff in the amount of $20,000.

Subsequent paragraphs of the petition allege as follows: Paragraph 3: That the plaintiff was the owner of a certain automobile having a reasonable market value of $1,950. Paragraph 4: That the plaintiff, on February 12, 1954, was operating the car at the intersection of North Druid Hills Road and Peachtree Road, and was in the process of making a left turn onto Peachtree Road. Paragraph 5: That as the plaintiff was making the turn, the defendant Sidney Mulligan, operating a vehicle owned by the defendant Brookhaven Supply Company, disregarded the plaintiff's vehicle which was in the intersection, and Mulligan made a left turn off Peachtree Road onto North Druid Hills Road and struck and damaged the plaintiff's vehicle. Paragraph 6: That Mulligan did not have his vehicle under control, was not attentive to other users of the street, and failed to yield the right of way to a vehicle already within the intersection. Paragraph 7: That at all times material herein Mulligan was the agent, servant and employee of Brookhaven Supply Company and was within the scope of his agency. Paragraph 8: That as a result of the collision the plaintiff's vehicle was injured, diminishing the market value in a designated amount. Paragraph 9: That due to the collision the plaintiff was thrown about in the car and sustained bruises, abrasions, and an injury to the cervical spine. Paragraph 10: That as a result of the injuries he suffered physical and mental pain and still suffers and will continue to suffer for as long as he lives. Paragraph 11: That the plaintiff incurred medical expenses to the amount of approximately $100 and reserves the right to amend his petition to add future expenses. Paragraph 12: That prior to the collision he was in good physical condition and that subsequent to the collision he has been unable to pursue his usual occupation. Paragraph 13: That the injuries and damages resulted directly and proximately from the negligence of the defendant. Paragraph 14: The alleged acts of negligence on the part of the defendants are set out in detail.

The plaintiff amended the petition by striking paragraph 11 and by adding in lieu thereof a new paragraph which showed expenses of $357.50. In this same amendment the plaintiff added paragraph 15 which alleged that prior to the collision he was the owner of Briarwood Plumbing Company and earning $300 a month net to himself and that immediately after the collision he could earn only $40 a week on the average, amounting to a total loss in earnings of $8,320 plus future loss of earnings at the same rate for the remainder of his life.

The plaintiff amended the petition a second time by adding paragraph 16, alleging that he was 47 years of age and had a life expectancy of 23.17 years as of January 22, 1957, the date of that amendment.

The defendants answered, admitting paragraphs 1 and 7 of the petition and denying all others except paragraphs 15 and 16 which were not mentioned.

The case proceeded to trial before a jury. The jury found in favor of the plaintiff in the sum of $11,500. The defendants filed a motion for new trial on the statutory grounds and thereafter added 3 special grounds. The motion was denied and the case is here for review assigning error on this judgment.

The evidence shows substantially as follows: J. A. Newman, the plaintiff, testified that on February 12, 1954, he drove his automobile up to the intersection of North Druid Hills Road and Peachtree Road and waited for the traffic light to turn; that he signaled for a left turn with his hand and his blinker light and when the light turned, he pulled into the intersection and saw "a truck on Peachtree Road headed south with Mr. Mulligan driving"; that he saw the defendant watching a bulldozer; that witness got almost straight into Peachtree Road and practically under the light when the defendant's truck struck his automobile; that after the collision the defendant told him he had not seen him.

The plaintiff went into great length as to the disability which accrued as a result of the injury and as to his earnings before and after. This evidence was substantiated by Dr. H. E. Stanford, who testified that he had been practicing chiropractic work for about 26 years.

Mrs. M. G. Varble testified that she knew the plaintiff and that he was extremely nervous and upset; that he walked the floor and would take one aspirin and bufferin after the other; that she had seen him take as many as six at a time; that she quit working for him because he was so nervous.

Mrs. J. A. Newman, the plaintiff's wife, testified that he was not the same person physically after the collision; that he acted differently and his irritability and nervousness made it difficult for anyone to get along with him; that he does not sleep well; that during the night he will get up and go to the sofa so she can get some rest; that regardless of which position he is in he can not rest; that after the collision he had a bad limp and that one leg is shorter than the other; that the plaintiff has been to various doctors but has had no relief.

Dr. William Bondurant testified that the plaintiff came to him for examination; that he examined the plaintiff; that plaintiff told him that he could work only for short periods of time because of pains in his leg and spine. He testified that the plaintiff's reflexes were equal and active in both legs; that no deformity or abnormality of the spine was apparent except that the motions of his spine were slower and more pronounced than normal. He went extensively into other complaints and the examination of the plaintiff and summed it up by stating that he did not find any permanent disability that could be attributable to the accident of February 12, 1954. On cross-examination he testified that the plaintiff had a shorter left leg and roughening or spur formation both in the neck or lumbar spine; that these were not normal but that these abnormalities would not necessarily result from the injury.

Mr. Garvin Buice testified for the defendant that he heard the impact when the collision occurred and "turned around"; that he talked to the plaintiff a few minutes after it occurred; that he did not go to the wreck after it happened, although it was only about forty feet away from his station.

There were other witnesses who testified as to the position of the cars, which testimony was approximately the same as that of Mr. Buice.

The defendant testified substantially that he was driving south on Peachtree Road and pulled up to the light at the intersection of North Druid Hills Road and Peachtree Road and stopped; that he intended to make a left turn into North Druid Hills Road which he indicated with his blinker signal; that while he was waiting for the light to change he noticed a bulldozer grading at the service station on his left; that he saw the plaintiff's automobile sitting at the gas pump between the building and the gas pump; that he started off in low gear and as he passed under the light, the plaintiff's automobile came around in front of him; that it was just two feet away; that he was traveling about 5 miles per hour and his truck struck the plaintiff's automobile. On cross-examination the defendant testified, "If I had been looking where I was driving I could have seen any object the size of Mr. Newman's automobile but I did not see him until after the accident." The defendant further testified that he quit his job with Brookhaven Supply Company of his own free will.

J. 1. Special ground 1 assigns error on all excerpt from the charge of the court substantially to the effect that the jury had an option as to whether or not they could use the Carlisle Mortality Table, without instructing them that the table could be used only if the jury should find that the injuries of the plaintiff were permanent and without making it clear as to when the use of the table was proper and appropriate in measuring the plaintiff's injuries. It is contended that the charge was not full and complete on this point. The court charged as follows: "The plaintiff contends that his injuries are permanent. In other words, he contends that they will last for the rest of his life. The defendants deny that the injuries of the plaintiff are permanent, if he was injured at all, and I charge you that the portion of the law which I shall now give to you in charge will be considered by you only in the event that you find that the plaintiff has suffered a permanent injury in the case. If you find that he has not suffered injury at all, or if you find he has suffered injury which is not of a permanent nature, you will not consider the charge which I shall now give you. But I charge you that if you find that the plaintiff has suffered a permanent injury and that he will suffer a decrease in his earning capacity for the rest of his life, you would arrive at the gross amount of such lost future earnings."

The court then charged: "There is in evidence a certain table known as a mortality table, which the jury may or may not use, as they see fit." The court then went fully and extensively into the method of using the mortality table. In Western & Atlantic R. Co. v. Smith, 145 Ga. 276 (6) (88 S. E. 983) this court said: "There being conflict in the evidence as to the extent of the injury to the plaintiff's person, and whether it was permanent or temporary in character, the court in instructing the jury as to the manner of using the annuity table in 70 Ga. 847, which had been introduced in evidence, should have so charged as to inform them that the table should not be used unless they believed that the injury was permanent. The charge given on the subject of the tables, and its context, were not such as to make this clearly appear." It will thus be seen that the charge there was not such as given in the instant case. Davison-Paxon Co. v. Archer, 91 Ga. App. 131 (85 S. E. 2d 182), cited by counsel for the defendant, fails to show cause for reversal of the instant case because of different phraseology used by the trial judge there and here. Such is also true of the following cases: Western & Atlantic R. Co. v. Knight, 142 Ga. 801 (83 S. E. 943); Powell v. Jarrell, 65 Ga. App. 453, 467 (11) (16 S. E. 2d 198), and Selman v. Davis, 94 Ga. App. 450 (95 S. E. 2d 44). In all the cases cited the ruling is that the court should make it clear to the jury when it is legally correct to use the mortality tables. It is our opinion that the court made it clear to the jury in the instant case as to the proper use of the Carlisle Mortality Table, and the special grounds show no cause for reversal.

Special ground 2 assigns error because it is contended that the court erred in failing to instruct the jury that the Carlisle Mortality Table could be considered by the jury only if the jury determined that the injuries of the plaintiff were of a permanent nature, and in failing to make it clear as to when the table could be used.

Special ground 3 assigns error because it is contended that the court erred in not instructing the jury so as to make it clear as to when the use of the Carlisle Mortality Table was proper and appropriate in measuring the plaintiff's damages. We see very little, if any, difference in the assignments of error of the three special grounds. They all refer to instructions or failure to instruct as to when the mortality table should be used. When the judge instructed the jury, if the disability were permanent, to determine "the gross amount of such lost future earnings" he was instructing them to find a total amount for the rest of the plaintiff's life, and he followed this by giving them the two principles which, in addition to the amount of diminution shown by the evidence, they would need to arrive at the figure--that is, the formula for determining the length of life, and the formula for reduction to present cash value. Under these circumstances the jury could not possibly be misled into believing the mortality tables were to be used if the injury were only temporary in character. In our opinion this charge amply met these requirements.

The special grounds, in view of the entire charge, show no cause for reversal.

2. The evidence is sufficient to sustain the verdict of the jury.

Judgment affirmed. Townsend and Carlisle, JJ., concur.