Fannie Price brought suit against T. R. Harris and Mrs. T. R. Harris in the Superior Court of Haralson County, Georgia, for injuries received while riding in a truck owned by T. R. Harris and being operated, at the time of the occurrence involved, by Mrs. T. R. Harris. The plaintiff alleged: that, while she was riding in the truck driven by Mrs. Harris, she had completed her work for the day and Mrs. Harris was driving the plaintiff home from work at the business of the defendants, who operated a flower shop in Tallapoosa, Georgia; that Taliferro Street is a street running east and west in that city; that Manning Street is a public street running north and south, intersecting Taliferro Street; that at the time of the occurrence Mrs. Harris was driving in an easterly direction on Taliferro Street and was approaching and entering the intersection of Manning Street; that at the time Mrs. Harris entered the intersection, a car operated by C. E. Hutcheson was proceeding north on Manning Street and had entered said intersection of the two streets; that the Hutcheson car had approached and entered the intersection from the right of the truck operated by Mrs. Harris and was entitled to the right of way at said intersection; that Mrs. Harris was under a duty to yield the right of way at said intersection as she was approaching the said Hutcheson's car from its left; that Mrs. Harris recklessly and heedlessly drove the truck into said intersection without observing her duty to yield the right of way to the car operated by Hutcheson and thereby she ran into said car, inflicting grievous wounds and injuries upon the plaintiff. The petition alleged: that there were no stop signs or signals at the intersection; that said intersection is highly dangerous for all traffic driving east on Taliferro Street; that, at the time and place Mrs. Harris recklessly and heedlessly drove the truck into the intersection, she failed to reduce the speed of the truck as she approached and entered the intersection. The injuries which the plaintiff received by reason of the collision and the many acts of negligence of Mrs. Harris are set forth. We do not deem it essential to reiterate them here. Her earning capacity and life expectancy are set forth as well as the expenses incurred in treating her injuries. In the first count the plaintiff charged gross negligence. Thereafter, the plaintiff added a second count, relying upon the same state of facts in the main, but charging simple negligence. The jury returned a verdict for $1,000 against the defendants on count 2. They filed a motion for a new trial on the statutory grounds and thereafter added 3 special grounds.

Several demurrers were filed and objections made by counsel for the defendants during the progress of the trial, but the only assignments of error in the bill of exceptions are to the judgment of the court overruling the general and special grounds.

J. 1. We will deal with the general grounds and special ground 1 together. It will be noted that the first count is based on gross negligence and the second count on ordinary care or simple negligence. The court submitted the case to the jury on both counts and instructed them that they could render a verdict on only one of she counts. The jury returned a verdict on count 2. The Court of Appeals held in Nash v. Reed, 81 Ga. App. 473 (1) (59 S. E. 2d 259): "An invited guest in or upon an automobile, to whom the owner or operator thereof owes the duty of exercising slight care for his safety, is one who is riding in or upon the automobile by invitation of the owner or operator solely for the guest's benefit, and not for the purpose of conferring any benefit upon his host." Headnote 2 of the same opinion reads: "An invitee in or upon an automobile, to whom the owner or operator thereof owes the duty of exercising ordinary care for his safety, is one whose presence in or upon the automobile is by invitation of the owner or operator for the purpose of conferring some substantial benefit upon his host, that is, something more than merely affording the host the pleasure of the guest's company." In arriving at this decision this court cited the following cases: Holtsinger v. Scarborough, 69 Ga. App. 117 (1, 2) (24 S. E. 2d 869), and Atlantic Co. v. Taylor, 80 Ga. App. 25, 30 (54 S. E. 2d 910). It is contended particularly in the case at bar that the plaintiff was a servant of the defendant. The evidence clearly reveals that the plaintiff was working for fifty cents per hour for the defendants and that she had finished her hours of work and Mrs. Harris was taking her home. Count 2 alleged that the transportation of the plaintiff by the defendant to and from her work was a part of her compensation. The plaintiff testified that as a part of her compensation the defendant, her employer, was to transport her to and from work in bad weather or when she worked at night. Her employer, the defendant, testified that there was no such agreement, but she was taking her home from work because she had a cold and the weather was extremely cold. The jury adopted the plaintiff's evidence. The evidence authorizes the finding that the transportation of the plaintiff by Mrs. Harris engaged in at the time of the injury of the plaintiff was a part of her compensation as an employee and benefitted the defendants as well as the plaintiff. If, under the facts of this case, the plaintiff was a servant of the defendants, we know of no law that would excuse the defendants from exercising ordinary care. In support of this contention counsel for the defendants call our attention to Code 66-303 captioned: " Assumption of Risks by Servants. " That Code section, as we construe it, is not applicable whatsoever to the facts in the instant case. See also Atlanta & Birmingham Air Line Ry. v. McManus, 1 Ga. App. 302 (8) (58 S. E. 258), and Simowitz v. Register, 60 Ga. App. 180 (3 S. E. 2d 231). The court did not err in denying the motion for new trial on the general grounds and special ground 1.

2. Special ground 2 assigns error on an excerpt from the charge of the court as follows: "I charge you that it is contended by the defendant, and I don't intimate what was proved or what was not proved, that is for you to determine, but it is contended by the defendant that the automobile of Mr. Hutcheson had entered the intersection prior to the time that Mrs. Harris, that is, the defendant in this case driving the panel truck, entered the highway, and if you should find that to be true, this rule which I have just given you would not apply. But that, gentlemen, is a matter entirely for you to determine from the evidence in the case, all the facts and circumstances." This special ground is incomplete because it assigns error because the court stated "this rule which I have just given you would not apply" without giving that part of the charge of the court which set out the rule to which reference is made. This special ground is not considered by this court because the ground is incomplete within itself.

3. Special ground 3 assigns error on the failure of the court, without a request, to instruct the jury on the rulings of law contained in Code 66-301 and 66-303. These sections have no application to the facts of this case. This special ground is not meritorious.

The court did not err in denying the motion for new trial.

Judgment affirmed. Townsend and Carlisle, JJ., concur.